Hobbes's State of Nature: A Modern Bayesian Game-Theoretic Analysis

Abstract

ABSTRACT:Hobbes's own justification for the existence of governments relies on the assumption that without a government our lives in the state of nature would result in a state of war of every man against every man. Many contemporary scholars have tried to explain why universal war is unavoidable in Hobbes's state of nature by utilizing modern game theory. However, most game-theoretic models that have been presented so far do not accurately capture what Hobbes deems to be the primary cause of conflict in the state of nature—namely, uncertainty, rather than people's egoistic psychology. Therefore, I claim that any game-theoretic model that does not incorporate uncertainty into the picture is the wrong model. In this paper, I use Bayesian game theory to show how universal conflict can break out in the state of nature—even when the majority of the population would strictly prefer to cooperate and seek peace with other people—due to uncertainty about what type of person the other player is. Along the way, I show that the valuation of one's own life is one of the central mechanisms that drives Hobbes's pessimistic conclusion.

Punishment and disagreement in the state of nature

“…2, Hampton 1986 3), more recent ones emphasize that Hobbes allows for two different types, and I will closely follow these latter analyses myself (Kavka 1986: Ch. 3;Dodds and Shoemaker 2002;Vanderschraaf 2006;Chung 2015). Consider the following key passage: because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist (L 13:4, emphasis mine) Here, Hobbes distinguishes dominators, who prefer exploiting others to peace, from moderates, who prefer peace to exploiting others (Kavka 1986: 97).…”

“…3). This is in part because they are glorious, seeking power for its own sake even beyond the long-term benefits it brings (Chung 2015).…”

“…2;Hampton 1986: Chs 2-3;Kavka 1986: Ch. 3;Dodds and Shoemaker 2002;Vanderschraaf 2006;Chung 2015). But such analyses of Locke's state of nature are rare, and those few on offer omit the peace-enhancing role of punishment altogether, despite this being, on the interpretation I present, the key difference between Hobbes's and Locke's states of nature (Kavka 1986: Ch.…”

Governance in Blockchain Technologies & Social Contract Theories

“…The initial situation serves as a rationale for such isolated individuals to agree to collectively relinquish (some of) their individual rights for the sake of forming a supra-individual structure of government. For Hobbes, a core feature of the state of nature is that it results in a high level of uncertainty for its inhabitants, 24 implying that individuals are unable to reach agreement on certain issues because they cannot trust that all parties involved will honor the agreement. This leads to the situation described by Chung as a constant potential for a "war of every man against every man" (Chung, 2015: 485), a state of affairs undesirable for the individuals living in this situation, which provides them with the justification to form a government.…”

Enough and as Good: A Formal Model of Lockean First Appropriation

“…Therefore, we will focus on strategies that map only from the state variables (the structure of land ownership, the level of previous investment´γt∂L, {c t i } i=A,B , and {c t+1 i } i=A,B ) onto strategies (investment decisions and general equilibrium production and trade). 4 Welfare Analysis…”