How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why

Abstract

We know that a revolution’s success largely depends on the army’s response to it. But can we predict the military’s reaction to an uprising? This book argues that it is possible to make a highly educated guess—and in some cases even a confident prediction—about the generals’ response to a domestic revolt if we know enough about the army, the state it is supposed to serve, the society in which it exists, and the external environment that affects its actions. Through concise case studies of modern uprisings in Iran, China, Eastern Europe, Burma, and the Arab world, the book looks at the reasons for and the logic behind the variety of choices soldiers ultimately make. The book offers tools—in the form of questions to be asked and answered—that enable analysts to provide the most informed assessment possible regarding an army’s likely response to a revolution and, ultimately, the probable fate of the revolution itself. It examines such factors as the military’s internal cohesion, the regime’s treatment of its armed forces, and the size, composition, and nature of the demonstrations. This book explains how generals decide to support or suppress domestic uprisings.

Grist to the mill of subversion: strikes and coups in counterinsurgencies

“…Research suggests that soldiers particularly fear for the military’s corporate interests when they are confronted with peaceful protests (Barany, 2016). If governments order harsh repression to quell nonviolent resistance, officers and the rank and file carefully consider the risks of internal divisions, reputational damage, and international repercussions (DeMeritt, 2015: 432–434; Janowitz, 1988: 113).…”

“…Soldiers have staged coups for personal reasons such as private political convictions or unfulfilled career ambitions, but "the defense or enhancement of the military's corporate interests is easily the most important interventionist motive" (Nordlinger, 1977: 65). 4 Research suggests that soldiers particularly fear for the military's corporate interests when they are confronted with peaceful protests (Barany, 2016). If governments order harsh repression to quell nonviolent resistance, officers and the rank and file carefully consider the risks of internal divisions, reputational damage, and international repercussions (DeMeritt, 2015: 432-434;Janowitz, 1988: 113).…”

“…Regarding soldiers’ coup disposition, the Arab Spring created the expectation that militaries confronted with peaceful demonstrations oust their repressive governments in solidarity with the people in the streets (e.g. Barany, 2016; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Johnson and Thyne, 2018; Nepstad, 2011). In many political settings, however, alliances between protesters and the military are implausible (Holmes and Koehler, 2020; O’Donnell, 1988).…”

The Security-Force Ethnicity (SFE) Project: Introducing a new dataset

“…This approach acknowledges that representation can have very different meanings across ranks, as well as the potentially vital role that even enlisted soldiers can play in ultimately determining military-related behavior (e.g. Barany, 2016).…”

Revolutions and the Military: Endgame Coups, Instability, and Prospects for Democracy

“…The co-occurrence of military coups with popular uprisings has thus reinvigorated a debate on the effects of military intervention. To begin with, analyses of regime trajectories in the Arab Spring have emphasized the crucial role of military behavior (Barany, 2016; Bellin, 2012; Holmes & Koehler, 2018; Koehler, 2017). Only where military organizations defected from dictators did popular mass uprisings succeed in deposing chief executives.…”