How much power do oppositions have? Comparing the opportunity structures of parliamentary oppositions in 21 democracies

Abstract

We cannot imagine a political system without opposition. Despite this crucial position in politics, political science has largely neglected to study oppositions. Attempting to fill this gap, this article analyses the institutional opportunities of parliamentary oppositions. It offers a parsimonious framework by distinguishing two dimensions of opposition influence: Some institutions enable oppositions to control governments, while others offer opportunities to present alternatives. A comparison of oppositions' opportunities in 21 democracies shows that countries fall into four groups along these dimensions: In majoritarian democracies, weak control mechanisms are countered by excellent opportunities to publicize alternatives. Consociational democracies are characterized by strong control mechanisms, but provide only weak opportunities to present alternatives. Moreover, in Southern Europe, control mechanisms and opportunities to present alternatives are weak, while both are pronounced in Nordic Europe. The results are summarized in three indices that can easily be applied in future research examining oppositions and their power.

Comparing oppositional behaviour in European Union affairs: empirical evidence from six member states

“…Expressing critique serves two purposes. On the one hand, it works as a means for controlling the government (Garritzmann 2017: 2), on the other hand, voicing critique allows the opposition parties to distance themselves from the government and make themselves more visible to the voters (Norton 2008: 238). However, opposition is also a matter of presenting alternatives, and this type of opposition is important since it introduces choice in politics.…”

“…Finally, based on previous rankings of national parliaments in terms of their institutional strength in EU politics (cf. Auel et al 2015b;Garritzmann 2017;Raunio 2005), our sample includes three high ranked (Denmark, Germany and Sweden, two mid ranked (Austria and the UK), and one low ranked parliament (Ireland).…”

MP Firefighting and the Partisan Logic

“…Previous studies have in particular focused on different institutional opportunities for MPs to engage in control of government actions. Institutional set‐up in terms of different modes in parliament (King ; Andeweg & Nijzink ), the construction of legislative power indexes (Fish & Kroenig ; Chernykh et al ), specific parliamentary institutional strength measures (Sieberer ; Winzen ), and institutional opportunities for opposition activity (Garritzmann ). The behavioural dimension has received less attention, like when and for what purpose MPs use control institutions.…”

Dáil reforms since 2011: Pathway to power for the ‘puny’ parliament?

“…Garritzmann (2017) demonstrates that the opposition has a very weak capacity to control the government, although the Dáil scores better for the opposition's ability to present alternative policies. It is accepted that parliamentary procedure -meaning the set of rules and institutions which govern the interaction between the legislature and the executive, and which outline how parliament goes about its business -contributes significantly to this weakness.…”

“…Most parliaments therefore lie somewhere in the middle of this spectrum; the Dáil has always been placed closer to the 'centralised' end (see Döring, 1995). Indeed, Garritzmann (2017), in a study of opposition power in parliamentary democracies, located Ireland at zero on a scale of zero to one, where for comparative purposes Austria and Belgium were both ranked at 0.86. Tsebelis & Rasch (2011, p. 6) group instruments of agenda-setting power into five categories:…”