Hungary: the emergence of chancellor democracy

Schiemann, John W.

doi:10.1080/1357233042000322265

Cited by 12 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…Others have argued that in the inter-party mode, '[b]y definition, the opposition is a minority and therefore powerless except for the rare occasions when a wedge can be driven between the governing parties'. 60 This is also true for the post-communist world: the opposition has a serious impact on the government only if, and to what extent, it manages to disrupt the party dynamics of the governing parties. Their ability to do so depends on two main factors: the formal powers of the opposition as defined by the institutional setting and the stability of the parties in government and in opposition.…”

Section: The Modes Of Executive -Legislative Relations: Consequences mentioning

confidence: 91%

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Parliamentary Opposition in Post-Communist Democracies: Power of the Powerless

Kopecký¹,

Spirova²

2008

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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This article charts the development of parliamentary opposition in post-communist Eastern Europe in the context of the changing nature of executive -legislative relations. We first review the existing literature on opposition in post-communist Europe. The second part of the article presents an analytical framework of different modes of executive -legislative interactions. Empirical analysis then demonstrates the practical relevance of these modes in post-communist political systems and their consequences for the position of the parliamentary opposition. We draw our empirical material from three countries of the region: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary. We demonstrate that political parties have become the principal source of parliamentary opposition in these countries. However, we also highlight the crucial link between party stability and the ability of the opposition to influence the policy-making process.

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Section: The Modes Of Executive -Legislative Relations: Consequences mentioning

confidence: 91%

“…59 Cabinet members are drawn from the ranks of parliamentarians, coalition agreements and party manifestos have been important reference documents for the bulk of the cabinets, party discipline within the legislature is usually strong, and investiture votes are mandatory.…”

Section: The Modes Of Executive -Legislative Relations: Consequences mentioning

confidence: 99%

Parliamentary Opposition in Post-Communist Democracies: Power of the Powerless

Kopecký¹,

Spirova²

2008

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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“…Hungary has a mixed electoral system which has contributed to the emergence of a bipolar party system and formation of small stable coalitions. The Hungarian constitution also provides for a dominant position of the prime minister inside the cabinet (Schiemann 2004; Brusis 2006). Poland and the Czech Republic have proportional electoral systems which has been conducive to more volatile coalition politics and frequent minority administrations.…”

Section: Cases Methods and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Core Executives and Coordination of Eu Law Transposition: Evidence From New Member States

Zubek

2010

Public Administration

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This article compares cabinet institutions for coordinating the transposition of EU legislation in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. It examines how national executives have adapted to European integration and what factors have shaped institutional variation across countries and over time. During pre-accession, the Hungarian, Polish and (to a lesser extent) Czech cabinets established strong core executives for tracking EU-related legislative commitments, monitoring progress and reviewing the quality of transposition. After accession, the cores in all three cabinets loosened the grip on transposition, although to different degrees. The analysis shows that, if sectoral factors are kept constant, variation in the patterns of national adaptation can be explained with reference to external incentives and constitutional rules. High benefits of transposition before accession encouraged centralization, particularly in prime-ministerial cabinets. Fewer incentives under full membership contributed to a halt or reversal in core executive ascendancy, especially in ministerial-type cabinets.

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“…The President of the Republic, elected by the Assembly, has more in common with a constitutional monarch than with a politically active role; he has an in- There are other institutional aspects that move in the same direction: the electoral system with wide margins of disproportionality, the "vote of constructive distrust", the lack of a vote of confidence, as well as the political activism of the Government Cabinet combined with a certain consolidation of the party system and with the international political pressures aimed at shifting the balance of power in favour of the executive without risking too much the interference of the parliamentary passages [Schiemann, 2004].…”

Section: From the Parliamentary Democracy To A "Chancellor Democracy"mentioning

confidence: 99%

Governmental Leadership without a Political Party

Mucci¹

2018

OJPS

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This article focuses on the theme of strengthening government leadership within contemporary democracy schemes, irrespective of their forms of Government-parliamentary or presidential. They are, in most cases, leaders-without-party in the sense that, though (formally) sponsored by a political party, they manage to impose and legitimize themselves by virtue of their personalities along with a team of loyal followers, doing without their own party and often opposing to it. This phenomenon of "leadership concentration" of the head of Government is evident even in parliamentary systems where-according with the Germany's historical prototype-is defined as a "chancellor democracy". We can get many examples of this tendency around the world in the latest ten years. The Italian political experience of the last thirty years is assumed as an interesting case study, demonstrating the vitality and at same time the hidden risks of that process which enhances the personalistic model of "leader-without-party". All within the framework of a weak and partial democracy that is defined in various ways: hybrid, dissociative, personalized-prodromal signs of a possible step back towards a "populistic style".

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Hungary: the emergence of chancellor democracy

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

Parliamentary Opposition in Post-Communist Democracies: Power of the Powerless

Parliamentary Opposition in Post-Communist Democracies: Power of the Powerless

Core Executives and Coordination of Eu Law Transposition: Evidence From New Member States

Governmental Leadership without a Political Party

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