Hypothesizing from Introspections: A Model for the Role of Mental Entities in Psychological Explanation ¹

Abstract

For many years, research in cognitive and social psychology has emphasized the importance of the subject's awareness of his-own mental entities (measured by introspection) for the explanation of human behavior. Recently, Nisbett and Wilson (1977b) have come to a provocative antiintrospectivist conclusion (AIC). Based on a review of experimental evidence, they suggest that (a) people have little or no access to their own mental processes, and (b) when people do try to explain their own behavior, they base their explanations on existing available theories instead of their introspections. Here is a summary of their major points: "Evidence is reviewed which suggests that there may be a little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Subjects are sometimes (a) unaware of th-e existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed here that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do soon the basis of any true introspection. Instead their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgement, about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response."(P. 231)The purpose of this paper is (a) to isolate the flaws in the way Nisbett and Wilson reached the AIC and the "available theory" thesis, and (b) to develop an alternative model-the "hypothesizing from introspections" (HI) model-which emphasizes the possibility of a person's access to his mental entities. The article emphasizes the following points: First, a brief clarification of Nisbett and Wilson's differentiation between mental processes and mental contents will be given (for the sake of clarity I will use the term mental entities as a general category for what people can become aware 09.Second, the way in which Nisbett and Wilson reached the AIC and the logical structure of their arguments will be described. Third, based on Nisbett and Wilson's differentiations between the subject's awareness of the 2 12 Sam S. Rakover stimulus, the response, and the processes by which one leads to the other, a model is developed according to which the subject is conceived of as a scientist who plans his internal observations and who hypothesizes from his mental entities. Fourth, some of Nisbett and Wilson's experiments will be reanalyzed from the point of view of the proposed model. Finally in the light of the HI model, Nisbett and Wilson's non-self report criterion for determining the subject awareness will be discussed.Nisbett and Wilson's paper has generated many criticisms, most of them are methodological (e.g., Smith and Miller, 1978;White, 1980;Adair and Spinner, 1981). In comparison, the present paper presents on the one hand a philosophical critique, and on the other an alternative model-the HI model-which accounts for Nisbett and Wilson's empirical results.

That’s the way the ball bounces: infants’ and adults’ perception of spatial and temporal contiguity in collisions involving bouncing balls

“…An alternative view is that causes cannot be observed directly (e.g. Nisbett & Ross, 1980;Rakover, 1983;Ross & Fletcher, 1985), but must be inferred from probabilistic causal cues (e.g. Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986).…”

Knowing more about what we can tell: ‘Introspective access' and causal report accuracy 10 years later

“…Both Nisbett & Ross (1980) and Rakover (1983) advance a definition of 'process' as causal relations between mental events or entities. This potentially offers a reasonable prospect for a definition of the term, although the nature of a causal relation itself is not easy to define (Shaver, 1985).…”

“…For this reason, the ease and automaticity with which it slips into our statements and postulates about consciousness and related matters should not be taken as evidence of its validity. There are many possible relationships between each of experiences, awarenesses, consciousness and introspection and, on the one hand, internal events of any sort, and, on the other hand, verbal reports, which are not demonstrably less valid than this cultural theory (Baars, 1983;Ericsson & Simon, 1980;Rakover, 1983). White (1986) argues that issues of communication of information are not issues of consciousness at all, and indeed information-processing models (e.g.…”

“…If an assumption about this relationship cannot be validated, then there is little prospect for using verbal reports to test hypotheses about ' introspective access '. Rakover (1983) provides an analysis of the assumptions made by Nisbett & Wilson that somewhat resembles that of White. In his view, Nisbett & Wilson claim that the traditional theory of verbal reports has two assumptions : (i) mental entities are the causes for the subject's behaviour (Rakover defines mental processes as causal relations among mental entities) ; (ii) the subject has introspective access to his or her mental entities.…”

Scientific psychology and hermeneutical psychology: Causal explanation and the meaning of human action

“…Of course few now follow Watson in rejecting such constructs as nonexistent and non-scientific: rather such theoretical constructs are held to refer to (as yet unspecified) neurophysiological states whose existence and operation can be confirmed by predictions of behavioural variance derived from the theory (Fodor, 1975). Thus despite some optimistic calls for a reappraisal of the role of introspection in psychology (Radford, 1974;Rakover, 1983), and recommendations that psychologists attend to agents' own explanatory accounts of their behaviour (Allport, 1937;Harr6 and Secord, 1972), many practising psychologists remain wholly unconvinced and sceptical. Indeed in the last decade there has been a strong reaction to such suggestions, particularly by critics who cite empirical studies which appear to show that the 'lay scientist' is regularly mistaken in the identification of his cognitive-affective states and estimation of their'causal role in action (Evans and Wason, 1976;Nisbett and Wilson, 1977;Nisbett and Ross, 1980).…”