Knowing more about what we can tell: ‘Introspective access' and causal report accuracy 10 years later

Abstract

Nisbett & Wilson (1977a) proposed that people lack ‘introspective access' to their mental processes, and that retrospective causal reports about those processes are in general inaccurate. This paper reviews the literature subsequent to that proposal. This literature has established that: (i) the term ‘process' lacks clear, adequate and valid definition; (ii) the proposal depends upon an untested assumption that verbal reports are valid indicators of ‘introspective access’; (iii) knowledge of the process is not sufficient for an accurate report about causal relations between stimuli and responses. Hypotheses about causal report accuracy can be tested, but there are severe methodological difficulties associated with measures of actual effects, the conditions under which retrospective causal reports are given and the use of ‘observer’ groups to rule out specific sources of information. Of the recent studies, none has achieved unambiguous support for, or falsification of, even a weak form of the proposal. There is no justification at present for using the proposal to interpret null results on verbal report measures. Some issues of broader significance are discussed, including the usefulness of verbal reports in research, the place of cultural beliefs in theoretical statements, and the social and practical context of verbal reports.

Verbal protocol accuracy in fault diagnosis

“…A good many other factors may be responsible for this, e .g . adopting inadequate verbalization procedures or comparing two sets of data which capture different components of the cognitive processes supposedly referred to (see also Haider-Hasebrink, 1990 ;Sanderson, 1989 andWhite, 1988) . In the present study, one should be seriously wary of the latter possibility since the performance data encompassed the actual test actions of the -33 -subjects while the protocol data (also) incorporated the subjects' planning and evaluative behaviors .…”

Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments

“…Subjects often are not reliable about the content of their judgments, since the content of a state does not always match the way we are conscious of the state. It is well-known that we sometimes confabulate beliefs or desires to rationalize a certain situation or accommodate preconceived ideas (Nisbett & Wilson 1977;White 1988;and Wilson, Hodges, & LaFleur 1995). When we do, we are conscious of ourselves as having a belief or desire that we do not actually have.…”

Ambiguity in the internal/external distinction in causal attribution

“…Different hierarchical arrangements are also possible. For example, one can be based on the distinction made by Kruglanski (1975) between voluntary actions and involuntary occurrences, and that made by White (1988White ( , 1989 between mental operations believed to involve free will and consciousness and those believed to be unconscious and deterministic.…”