I-Knowing How and Knowing That: A Distinction Reconsidered

Snowdon, Paul F.

doi:10.1111/1467-9264.t01-1-00001

Cited by 75 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Stanley and Williamson, ; White, ) and claimed that the concept of knowledge‐how is ill‐defined (e.g. Snowdon, ). Crucially, the question of knowing‐that and knowing‐how is central to the study of expertise.…”

Section: Knowing‐how and Knowing‐thatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Three Views on Expertise: Philosophical Implications for Rationality, Knowledge, Intuition and Education

Gobet¹

2017

Journal of Philosophy of Education

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Section: Knowing‐how and Knowing‐thatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Three Views on Expertise: Philosophical Implications for Rationality, Knowledge, Intuition and Education

Gobet¹

2017

Journal of Philosophy of Education

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“…In this sense, A and B both know how to learn carpentry and the ability is properly described as a skill or as know‐how, to distinguish it from capacities like breathing that cannot be so described (cf. Snowdon, 2003). 1 Both have the capacity to learn carpentry, but A also has knowledge and technique that enable her to learn it more effectively than B.…”

Section: The Claim That We Are ‘Born To Learn’ and The Confusion Betwmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A skill is, more precisely, a form of knowing how to do something , which is itself learned. To make the point clearer with an example, digesting is a capacity that I have, but it is not a skill since I can either digest normally or abnormally, but I cannot digest well or badly in the way that I can, for example, ride a bike correctly or incorrectly and, if correctly, well or badly (Snowdon, 2003). Skills are attributes that I have to learn before I can be said to have acquired them and, as with knowing how to do things generally, they are normative, that is, they must be done correctly if someone can be truly said to possess them.…”

Section: Trying To Attach Sense To ‘Learning How To Learn’mentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning How to Learn: A Critique

Winch

2008

Journal of Philosophy of Education

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The claim that ‘learning how to learn’ is the central ability required for young people to be effective ‘lifelong learners’ is examined for various plausible interpretations. It is vacuous if taken to mean that we need to acquire a capacity to learn, since we necessarily have this if we are to learn anything. The claim that it is a specific ability is then looked at. Once again, if we acquire an ability to learn we do not need the ability to learn how to learn. After noting the implausibility of any such general ability, the paper goes on to examine the claim that certain specific but transferable abilities might satisfy the description ‘learning how to learn’. Various candidates are considered: forming and testing hypotheses and abduction are two promising ones, but each has significant weaknesses. Numeracy and literacy are thought to be more promising, but achievements at the national level leave a lot to be desired, despite the clear advantages for learning of being able to read, write and count. If we needed to learn how to learn before we learned how to read, write and count, it is unlikely that we would get anywhere. Finally, certain non‐cognitive dispositions and character traits rather than cognitive attributes are considered and, drawing on the work of Robert Dearden and others, it is suggested that the development of these aretaic (virtue‐based) and personal qualities rather than cognitive ones may be most decisive for developing independent learning in a range of subject matters.

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“…Other recent discussions of the distinction includeSnowdon (2003);Noë (2005);Koethe (2002); andMoffett and Bengson (2007). These recent papers all, in some way, critique S&W's paper "Knowing How."…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

Empirical evidence and the knowledge-that/knowledge-how distinction

Adams

2008

Synthese

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In this article I have two primary goals. First, I present two recent views on the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (Stanley and Williamson, The Journal of Philosophy 98 (8): 411-444, 2001; Hetherington, Epistemology futures, 2006). I contend that neither of these provides conclusive arguments against the distinction. Second, I discuss studies from neuroscience and experimental psychology that relate to this distinction. Having examined these studies, I then defend a third view that explains certain relevant data from these studies by positing the double dissociation of knowledge-that and knowledge-how and that is also able to do explanatory work elsewhere.

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I-Knowing How and Knowing That: A Distinction Reconsidered

Cited by 75 publications

References 4 publications

Three Views on Expertise: Philosophical Implications for Rationality, Knowledge, Intuition and Education

Three Views on Expertise: Philosophical Implications for Rationality, Knowledge, Intuition and Education

Learning How to Learn: A Critique

Empirical evidence and the knowledge-that/knowledge-how distinction

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