I.—mr. Russell's “Causal Theory of Perception”

Newman’s Objection and the No Miracles Argument

“…But Ainsworth (2009, 150-152) and Frigg & Votsis (2011, 255-256) argue that versions of the objection arise for either approach. Newman (1928) launched what many consider to be a devastating objection to Russell's (1927) early version of structural realism. Demopolous & Friedman (1985) showed that Newman's Objection can equally be directed at structural realists who make use of Ramsey sentences.…”

“…(As it happens, this proposal also violates the grounding constraint: see footnote 21). 19 Of course, the structural realist might try to restrict the domain in some other way: perhaps a restriction to qualitative properties or a restriction to non-mathematical properties would work better. But Melia & Saatsi (2006, 5.2-5.4) consider these and other proposals and conclude that they are too weak: they cannot rule out certain trivial interpretations of the Ramsey sentence.…”

Chalmers’ Blueprint of the World

“…First is the traditional Newman problem, which was presented against the pure or logical structuralism of Russell (Newman 1928), and also applies against a similar view entertained at some point by the early Carnap, as well as against the extreme version of the Canberra plan with global Ramsification. The problem is that the relevant specifications of the world are nearly vacuously satisfied, if only the world has a sufficient number of objects.…”

Natural Individuals and Intrinsic Properties

“…A system of spatial relationships is too incomplete to constitute areal concrete entity. More recently, Max Newman (Newman 1928) argued against Russell's view that we know only the structural features of the world. He claimed that, unless we take into account the intrinsic features of the relata, there will be too many relations.…”