I. Reform or Revolution? The Financial Crisis, Eu Financial Markets Law, and the European Securities and Markets Authority

Abstract

Since the outset of the financial crisis, the EU financial markets regime1 has been undergoing a period of turbulence which contrasts sharply with the period of relative stability which it briefly enjoyed over 2005–2007 and post-FSAP (Financial Services Action Plan2). The FSAP reforms had been adopted. The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) had emerged as an influential actor, driving some degree of supervisory coordination and co-operation and constructing a significant soft law ‘rule-book.’ And the 2007 Lamfalussy Review suggested broad political, institutional and stakeholder satisfaction with the Lamfalussy process. There was little enthusiasm for grand adventures in institutional design, albeit that supervision, an institutionally-driven concern, was presciently if belatedly emerging as a concern of the EU institutions. The Review's main concern, however, was with strengthening the pragmatic, if somewhat haphazard, network-based, ‘supervisory convergence’ model as the means for supervising the integrating EU financial market. With respect to regulation, reflecting the wider international zeitgeist pre-crisis,3 ‘Better Regulation’ and the need for a ‘regulatory pause’ were the watchwords of a Commission which, once the massive FSAP regime was safely in place, espoused the benefits of self-regulation and highlighted the risks of intervention without impact assessment, extensive consultation and evidence of market failure.4 This was most apparent with respect to credit rating agencies,5 debt market transparency,6 hedge funds,7 and clearing and settlement.8 Institutionally, a relatively sophisticated law-making apparatus, in the form of the Lamfalussy structures, a plethora of advisory bodies and stakeholder bodies (notably FIN-NET which represents the consumer and SME interest), had been established.

Accountability through mutual attunement: How can parliamentary hearings connect the elected and the unelected?

“…Part of this move included the creation of the European Supervisory Framework, and the creation of ESMA (along with the EBA, and the EIOPA they form the ESA). We chose to focus on ESMA because it is an important example of a recent move towards delegating additional authority to agencies in the EU such as, direct intervention and supervisory powers (Moloney, 2011).…”

History Matters: How International Regimes Become Entrenched—and Why We Suffer for It

“…According to EU leaders, the ESAs precipitated a fundamental shift. However, the ESAs reflect more evolution than revolution (Moloney 2011). Scholars frequently refer to path dependencies, but none have yet specified the mechanisms or historicised the power structures that ensured continuity amid the profusion of new institutions.…”

On the Enforceability of EU Agencies’ Soft Law at the National Level:<br>The Case of the European Securities and Markets Authority

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