Illegal wildlife trade networks: finding creative opportunities for conservation intervention in challenging circumstances

Abstract

The challenges faced by small organizations confronting illegal wildlife trade (IWT) networks can be large and frightening. In a context of high corruption, political instability and social upheaval, obtaining information about actor identities, connections and trade flows may come with risks to personal security. Yet it is precisely in these contexts that illegal wildlife trade may flourish, piggybacking on trade in other contraband items. In our recent work, we examined the hypothesis that such 'parallel' trafficking would dominate trade in a threatened, Neotropical finch, the Red Siskin (RS, Spinus cucullatus) in Venezuela (S anchez-Mercado et al., 2019). Venezuela's economic situation has experienced historic declines since 2014: by 2017,~87% of the population lived in poverty, and from 2013 -2018, GDP fell over 45% (España & Ponce, 2017). We expected the lure of 'hard' foreign currency, combined with widespread lawlessness, to drive IWT in this bird, in parallel with other illicit items. In spite of these conditions, although we did find an active and complex RS trade network, we found little evidence for parallel trade, and instead found a network reliant on specialized logistical capacity for transport and enforcement evasion, as well as intermediaries with specialized skills. While this finding of an active network was not good news, the network structure we found presents unexpected opportunities for small organizations up against this trade challenge, particularly in a South American context.We are grateful to Farine (2020), Tsang (2020) and Kahler (2020) for their generous and valuable insights about our study, and their careful note of caveats and recommendations for future work. For example, we agree that finding no evidence for parallel trade does not mean such trade does not exist. As Kahler (2020) and Tsang (2020) note, detection of parallel trade is not simple, though our failure to find evidence of it is likely due less to under reporting by interview subjects (who freely shared information about contacts), than to insufficient sampling effort, particularly among potential international colluders and intermediaries. However, parallel trafficking is just one way that an IWT network may operate, with its organized pyramidal structure, and fluxes dominated by monopolistic or power figures, as in the case of rhino, ivory, or tiger products. The structure of the Neotropical parrot trade network presents another such alternative (Pires, Schneider, & Herrera, 2016). Similar to their findings, we found little formal organization between or among actors. This modus operandi, although not exclusive to South American countries, may be driven by their general lack of environmental law enforcement: ordinary individuals may participate in IWT, with low risk and without need for organized crime groups. Thus, our lack of detection of parallel trade may reflect reality, and not just sampling bias.The potential reality of a significant 'specialized' rather than parallel trade in RS is not only less frightening, i...

Understanding Social Dimensions in Wildlife Conservation: Multiple Stakeholder Views

“…They are assisted by the HWW, who work there when there is a necessity for monitoring and enforcement [ 1 , 37 ]. Therefore, community cooperation is needed to immediately report wildlife crimes and intensify active collaboration from all parties to assist in wildlife monitoring, thereby reducing dependency on limited conservation capacity and mitigating wildlife crimes [ 64 , 65 ]. Equally important, a lack of political will and the complexity of stakeholders’ competing interests in conservation versus social-economic development have complicated conservation efforts in this region.…”