Illiberal Constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary

Drinóczi, Tímea; Bień-Kacała, Agnieszka

doi:10.4324/9781003175353

Cited by 28 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Scholars read the ruling as a way for the Court to avoid embarrassing Parliament through the annulment of the provision—again, a deferential position, but now towards the legislature. At the same time, the Court also went beyond textual norms to create the abovementioned extraordinary requirements (Drinóczi and Bién-Kacała 2021a ). The position of the court resembles what Tew ( 2021 , p. 61) describes as a mini-maximalist strategy, with the court refraining from censuring the legislative branch but, in the holding, using a technique to tear down the boundaries of the textual statutory provisions.…”

Section: Courts and Covid-19: Case Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Courts and COVID-19: an Assessment of Countries Dealing with Democratic Erosion

2023

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article aims to present four case studies of the different responses to governmental measures to fight the COVID-19 pandemic by supreme and constitutional courts, especially in cases of jurisdictions that have been facing democratic erosion. The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic demanded immediate public policies and other political decisions from the branches of government. Executive authorities were the main actors in effecting constitutional public health norms. The expectation was that they will abide by the rule of law in fulfilling their duties; that has not been the case under governments that promoted democratic erosion. The different contexts of the threats posed to the constitutional democracies led populist and illiberal leaders to opportunistically either try to—and then be contained by courts—or effectively consolidate the expansion of powers under the conditions of the pandemic. Concentrating on four jurisdictions (the USA, Hungary, El Salvador, and Brazil), the article demonstrates that courts can effectively work as bulwarks against waves of democratic erosion, especially in situations of stress, as it was the case in the global COVID-19 pandemic. This hypothesis is also proven by episodes in which courts did not sufficiently operate to curb illiberalism because they were already captured. The analyses enable classifying the court’s responses to the COVID-19 executive measures in a threefold pattern: deferential, restrictive, and of forced capitulation.

show abstract

Section: Courts and Covid-19: Case Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Courts and COVID-19: an Assessment of Countries Dealing with Democratic Erosion

2023

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…129 This makes Hungary's constitutional position stable and corresponds to what Hungarian academia describes as constitutional illiberalism, deriving its power from the illiberal Fundamental Law. 130 Second, the fear of EU sanctions does indeed create a rational Strasbourg Court compliance incentive, but it is due to a relatively high threshold where only systemic non-compliance triggers sanctions, only of limited power. As my interviews uncover, this reflects in Hungary taking no issue with low-cost judgments (such as isolated violations) that have little or no actual and political implications, where the costs of compliance are insignificant compared to the high cost of a potential systemic non-compliance.…”

Section: T :       ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Controlling the Narrative: Hungary’s Post-2010 Strategies of Non-Compliance before the European Court of Human Rights

Kos

2023

European Constitutional Law Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Focus of the literature on the European West, overlooking the marginalised European Central-East – Assumption of all illiberal states equally resisting international courts – Hungary’s unique subtle push-back against the European Court of Human Rights compared to overt resistance against the European Court of Justice – Empirical analysis of original data – Three strategies to control the narrative of compliance – Status signalling to avoid international and domestic political repercussions – Friendly settlements and unilateral declarations as means of avoidance – Disguised non-compliance to convey bona fides – Negative narrative to subvert public opinion – Explaining state behaviour through rationalism and constructivism – Complementing constructivism with the identitarian counterwave in recently-emerged illiberal states – EU membership as a constraint – Illiberalism as fuel for Hungary’s resistance against the Strasbourg Court

show abstract

“…The Trump presidency and the insurrection of January 6, 2021 further crystallized worries about the scale of democratic backsliding in the United States. Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries such as Hungary and Poland have seen a drastic reduction in judicial independence, an increase in corruption, and government control of the media (Drinóczi & Bień‐Kacała, 2021). In Italy, the election of Giorgia Meloni, and the rise of the Brothers of Italy, portend the most far‐right leader since Mussolini.…”

Section: Democracy and Public Healthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Backsliding among indicators of democratic stability relevant to public health: Risks in OECD nations

Willison

Falkenbach

Greer

et al. 2022

World Med & Health Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Oppression and inequality, as critical social and structural determinants of health, are key threats to public health. Democratic stability provides institutional measures to mitigate oppression and inequality. We investigate trends in democratic backsliding in the Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) nations, overall, and compare trends in backsliding among specific indicators of democracy relevant to public health based on protections against oppression and inequality. We leverage a comprehensive, longitudinal, data set (V‐DEM), capturing key indicators of democracy in OECD nations from 2010 to 2020. Indicators were selected from the scholarly literature on democracy and health for their effects on oppression and inequality. We observe trends over time in democratic stability among OECD nations, overall, and then compare trends in democratic stability or backsliding across OECD nations within categories of democratic indicators established to mitigate oppression and inequality. Democracy is declining across all OECD nations. Broad democratic declines are shown between types of OECD member states. Country income is not necessarily protective for democratic stability. We find specific declines in two measures with immediate implications for public health—Civil Liberties and Integrity of the Courts—across at least half of all OECD nations and a particularly alarming level of change in the United States. Politics shape and limit public health. Declining components of democracy can have both short‐ and long‐term consequences for population health by increasing inequality and reducing mechanisms to protect against oppressive tactics. Public health can play an important role in improving democracy by strengthening accountability.

show abstract

Illiberal Constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary

Cited by 28 publications

References 0 publications

Courts and COVID-19: an Assessment of Countries Dealing with Democratic Erosion

Courts and COVID-19: an Assessment of Countries Dealing with Democratic Erosion

Controlling the Narrative: Hungary’s Post-2010 Strategies of Non-Compliance before the European Court of Human Rights

Backsliding among indicators of democratic stability relevant to public health: Risks in OECD nations

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About