Hungary and Poland have started their illiberal remodelling in 2010 and 2015 respectively. Both governments routinely apply the illiberal version of the Rule of Law (illiberal legality), which involves that every situation has the potential to be exploited for political gain. Both states opportunistically apply their constitutions and selectively invoke favourable constitutional provisions. And yet, this paper claims that the Hungarian Fundamental Law and the Polish Constitution are equipped with adequate emergency measures to provide for a proper framework for emergency legislation. In illiberal emergency constitutionalism, Hungary uses and abuses its Fundamental Law, while Poland is disregarding its binding 1997 Constitution and, at the same time, creates its new invisible illiberal constitution. This paper explores how it is done during the current human pandemic crisis by focusing on, first, the emergency regimes the constitutions provide for and their (non-)application. Second, it compares the operation of the parliaments as the Sejm chaotically passes crisis management related omnibus legislation and amendments on the presidential election during the extra-constitutional 'state of epidemic'. The Hungarian Parliament operates under the 'danger of crisis'. Yet, it still delivers regular legislative activities, as the emergency 'legislation' is done through governmental decree as per the Coronavirus Act 2020, which is unconstitutional. These phenomena necessitate an in-depth inquiry about the nature, form, and content of the Hungarian and Polish emergency legislation and governmental decrees. It is concluded that, under normal circumstances, the Hungarian and Polish constitutional measures set for guiding the authorities in emergencies are adequate. In the current political and constitutional setting and COVID-19 crisis, the form and the content of some essential Hungarian and Polish emergency measures stay below standards. It is a further warning sign for the European community to take Hungarian and Poland illiberal constitutionalism seriously. Their pushing the envelope will not end by itself.

This Article argues that, as far as Hungary and Poland are concerned, the use of term “illiberal constitutionalism” is justified. It also claims that, without denying that other states could also be considered illiberal democracies, Hungary and Poland display unique and distinctive features. These features include populist politics, which lead to the relativization of the rule of law and democracy principles, and human rights protection, which captured the constitution and constitutionalism by constitutionalizing populist nationalism, constitutional identity, and created new patrionalism and clientelism. All these features are supported by the ideological indoctrination of political constitutionalism. In the course of this process, formal and informal constitutional amendments are used, and a formal sense of constitutional democracy is maintained. Overturning these illiberal democracies by constitutional and legal means, at this time, seems doubtful, if not impossible.

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The issue of "constitutional identity" is a topic the relevance of which emerges in contemporary constitutional democracies in the context of constitutional changes. It has already attracted multilayered approaches, but its legal conceptualization is still underexposed. Based on regional European jurisprudence and doctrinal works, "constitutional identity" in a legal context is suggested to be viewed as the "identity of the constitution." The identity of the constitution is found among provisions of constitutional texts and related jurisprudence that specifically and exclusively feature a status that was constituted during the constitution-making process and shaped by either formal or informal constitutional amendments. The legally applicable "identity of the constitution" comprises those articles that can be employed vis-à-vis EU law and unconstitutional amendments, and which are arguably intended to be applied in the face of international human rights obligations. It is posited that Germany and Hungary exemplify the "confrontational with EU law model," while the model that emerged in the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court should be called the "cooperative model with embedded identity." Today, it seems that the very content of the identity of the constitution of a particular Member State may be shaped and preserved through an active and cooperative dialogue between the supranational and national courts, if there is an inclination to find uniqueness in a community based on common legal traditions and values-Germany and Italy. Another way of determining the content of "constitutional identity" is to fiercely try to demonstrate that uniqueness. This is what Hungary seems to be engaged in, and that is why it may be proposed to call the Hungarian model a model of confrontational individualistic detachment.

This paper argues that what has happened with and led to the 4th amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary adopted in 2013 (and to the 5th amendment of the same year) is a reasonable and simple consequence of the technique of the political power that has been exercised in Hungary since 2010 in the course of amending the former Constitution and of the preparation and adoption of the new one. In order to understand why the change is so drastic and radical, it is inevitable to assess constitutional politics between 1989 and 2010 from a perspective of the constitution-changing and -making powers and the methods and techniques employed. The outcomes of constitutional politics between 1989 and 2010 gave rise to political criticism and the developments related to the Constitution (Act XX of 1949) were also surrounded by evident dissatisfaction. Yet, what has been happening since 2010 is far more problematic in the light of constitutionalism and democratic values.