Impact of penalty–reward mechanism on the performance of electric distribution systems and regulator budget

Shourkaei, Hosein Mohammadnezhad; Fotuhi‐Firuzabad, Mahmud

doi:10.1049/iet-gtd.2009.0202

Cited by 32 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Since, the expected value of reward or penalty show the economic risk associated with the RPS for the DisCo [3], [7], it plays an important role in the electric distribution system planning studies. The expected value of reward or penalty is [8] …”

Section: Expected Reward or Penalty For Each Discomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [4], [6], and [7], the RPS is designed based on the Data Envelopment analysis (DEA). The authors in [8] proposed a designing method that not only motivates DisCos to improve the reliability level of their networks, but also, minimizes the implementation cost of the RPS for regulator. In [9], the RPS is designed based on a mathematical model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A new reward-penalty mechanism for distribution companies based on concept of competition

Jooshaki

Abbaspour

Fotuhi‐Firuzabad

et al. 2014

IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies, Europe

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In this paper, a new method for designing procedure of Reward-Penalty Scheme (RPS) in distribution system is proposed. Being fair and adoptable in viewpoint of distribution companies (DisCos) are main superiorities of the proposed RPS. Established based on concept of the Yardstick theory, its application can ensure regulators that a perfect competition will be created between DisCos to improve the service reliability. Also, such a regulation scheme can be a key for power system decision makers in order to prevent the DisCos from decreasing service reliability. Aimed to reach a fair mechanism, the proposed RPS rewards/penalizes the DisCos only compared with the other ones owning similar conditions. In this regard, Fuzzy C-means (FCM) clustering technique is applied to effectively categorize the similar DisCos into different groups. The average system reliability indices, i.e. System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) and Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS) are chosen as the comparison criteria in the proposed RPS. In order to illustrate efficiency of the proposed method, the proposed RPS is implemented on the Iranian electric power distribution sector to compare the abilities of different companies in reaching the predetermined goals.

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Section: Expected Reward or Penalty For Each Discomentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A new reward-penalty mechanism for distribution companies based on concept of competition

Jooshaki

Abbaspour

Fotuhi‐Firuzabad

et al. 2014

IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies, Europe

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Structures of these models depend on range of data, type of used reliability index in PBR, goal of system regulators, times of PBR execution, etc. [12]. The general form of RPS contains three zones: reward, dead and penalty zones.…”

Section: Reward and Penalty Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Whereas some customers cannot bear long time power interruptions, other customers are sensitive to the frequency of interruptions [12]. In this paper, more than one reliability index can be included in RPS and weighting value for each reliability index is calculated based on their impacts on the customers.…”

Section: Pbr Costmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [11], a mathematical model was presented to optimally set the parameters of RPS. In [12] a technique is proposed to not only motivate the utilities to improve their service quality but also equalize the total rewards paid and the total penalties received by regulators. The results of [12] indicated that implementing the proposed method can effectively improve the service reliability and zero the implementation cost of PBR.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Quality performance based regulation through designing reward and penalty scheme for electric distribution companies

Simab¹,

Haghifam²

2012

International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems

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Reliability incentive regulation based on reward‐penalty mechanism using distribution feeders clustering

Khonakdar-Tarsi

Fotuhi‐Firuzabad

Ehsan

et al. 2021

Int Trans Electr Energ Syst

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Summary This paper proposes an approach to enhance the reliability regulation based on the relative performance. In the proposed approach, the distribution system feeders are clustered based on the parameters, which cannot be controlled by distribution companies. Afterward, a reliability incentive regulation is applied to each cluster so that the performance of each feeder is compared to its counterparts in the same cluster. The quality regulation is designed based on the reward‐penalty mechanism, which penalizes feeders whose performance is worse than a benchmark and rewards those providing a performance higher than the benchmark. Then, the reward and penalty associated to the electric distribution company are determined to summarize the rewards and penalties for all feeders. Having this approach implemented, utilities compete to make more profits by serving customers at higher reliability levels. To assess the effectiveness of proposed method, it is applied to a real distribution network containing 194 feeders.

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Impact of penalty–reward mechanism on the performance of electric distribution systems and regulator budget

Cited by 32 publications

References 9 publications

A new reward-penalty mechanism for distribution companies based on concept of competition

A new reward-penalty mechanism for distribution companies based on concept of competition

Quality performance based regulation through designing reward and penalty scheme for electric distribution companies

Reliability incentive regulation based on reward‐penalty mechanism using distribution feeders clustering

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