Impact of Tenacity upon the Behaviors of Social Actors

el-Gemayel, Joseph; Sibertin-Blanc, Christophe; Chapron, Paul

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-16098-1_18

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…We just have to implement the model of the organization as a Multi-Agent System, where each actor is represented by an agent endowed with a rationality which enables him to play the social game in search of an acceptable satisfaction. We outline here the principles of the social game player algorithm implemented in the SocLab platform, many more details are presented in (El Gemayel et al 2011, El Gemayel 2013and Sibertin-Blanc et al 2013a) [13] .…”

Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 99%

SocLab: A Framework for the Modeling, Simulation and Analysis of Power in Social Organizations

Sibertin-Blanc¹,

Roggero²,

Adreit³

et al. 2013

JASSS

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This paper is a comprehensive presentation of a framework for the modeling, the simulation and the analysis of power relationships in social organizations, and more generally in systems of organized action. This framework relies on, and slightly extends, the Crozier and Freidber's sociology of organized action, which supports a methodology for understanding why, in an organizational context, people behave as they do. SocLab intends to complement the discursive statement of sociological analyses with a formal formulation easing the objectivization of findings. It consists of a meta-model of organizations, a model of bounded-rational social actors and analytical tools for the study of the internal properties of organizations.

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Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 99%

SocLab: A Framework for the Modeling, Simulation and Analysis of Power in Social Organizations

Sibertin-Blanc¹,

Roggero²,

Adreit³

et al. 2013

JASSS

Self Cite

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“…To achieve this, we developed a social simulation model within the SocLab framework [24][25][26] that provides a formalization of the Sociology of Organizational Action [27]. The model, along with its data modules, can be accessed at [28] for those interested in replicating our results or testing alternative scenarios.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition to simulating the social game, SocLab facilitates the study of the model's structural properties through analytical tools and exploration of the space of possible configurations, including Pareto optima, Nash equilibrium, structural conflicts, and more. The SocLab framework has been applied in the study of concrete organizations based on sociological inquiries [24][25][26].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulating and Contrasting the Game of Open Access in Diverse Cultural Contexts: A Social Simulation Model

Terán

Dávila

2023

Publications

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Open Access is a global cause with the aim of allowing unrestricted access to all scientific research output in electronic formats. This paper presents a model for simulating the game of interests behind this cause in order to investigate ways of promoting the practice of open access. The model represents the following actors: Academics, Administrators, Funders, Publishers and Politicians. Five scenarios were developed to represent both realistic and ideal, interesting, situations. The model was developed using the SocLab platform—a formalization of the sociology of organizational action. It is based on previous descriptions of the game and expert knowledge. A structural analysis permits us to examine the properties of the sub-model behind each scenario. The results corroborate certain intuitions about the scenarios representing realistic cases, e.g., they indicate that publishers, being isolated in their interests, are subject to strong pressures from other actors, who have a circumstantial alliance. Administrators take an intermediate stance in all scenarios. The best scenarios for open access are those in which Politicians and Funders clearly support the cause by expressing mandates in that direction, backing academics. Surprisingly, the model shows that it is in the Publishers’ interest not to take an extremist position against open access.

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“…Particular configurations of the relations of power in an organization (principal, supervisor, agent) have been investigated by Vafaï [5,6], who analysed couplings between different kinds of collusions in terms of mathematical theorems. The approach by Sibertin-Blanc and coworkers [8][9][10] develops the frames of SA in a consistent and methodical way. In this approach, each agent (actor) controls some relations which other agents can profit by.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game of collusions

Malarz¹,

Kułakowski²

2016

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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A new model of collusions in an organization is proposed. Each actor $a_{i=1,\cdots,N}$ disposes one unique good $g_{j=1,\cdots,N}$. Each actor $a_i$ has also a list of other goods which he/she needs, in order from desired most to those desired less. Finally, each actor $a_i$ has also a list of other agents, initially ordered at random. The order in the last list means the order of the access of the actors to the good $g_j$. A pair after a pair of agents tries to make a transaction. This transaction is possible if each of two actors can be shifted upwards in the list of actors possessed by the partner. Our numerical results indicate, that the average time of evolution scales with the number $N$ of actors approximately as $N^{2.9}$. For each actor, we calculate the Kendall's rank correlation between the order of desired goods and actor's place at the lists of the good's possessors. We also calculate individual utility funcions $\eta_i$, where goods are weighted according to how strongly they are desired by an actor $a_i$, and how easily they can be accessed by $a_i$. Although the individual utility functions can increase or decrease in the time course, its value averaged over actors and independent simulations does increase in time. This means that the system of collusions is profitable for the members of the organization

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Impact of Tenacity upon the Behaviors of Social Actors

Cited by 8 publications

References 4 publications

SocLab: A Framework for the Modeling, Simulation and Analysis of Power in Social Organizations

SocLab: A Framework for the Modeling, Simulation and Analysis of Power in Social Organizations

Simulating and Contrasting the Game of Open Access in Diverse Cultural Contexts: A Social Simulation Model

Game of collusions

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