In Defense of Informal Logic

Levi, Don S.

doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1850-9

Cited by 10 publications

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“…Lugg (1986) argues that deep disagreements are only a practical problem, not a problem for rationality itself: “It may well be true that deep disagreements pose formidable practical difficulties, but why think that they must also be impervious to reason and antithetical to resolution by rational argumentative exchange?” (p. 50). This argument was later also made by Phillips (2008) and, to some extent, by Levi (2000).…”

Section: Deep Disagreementsmentioning

confidence: 64%

Analytical categories to describe deficit attributions in deep disagreements between citizens and experts

2021

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Disagreements often arise from citizen–expert collaboration, as both agents share a different epistemic worldview. Fogelin, following Wittgenstein, proposed that some disagreements (i.e. deep disagreements) cannot be rationally solved when participants share different forms of life. Citizen–expert is an exemplar of this sort of disagreement. Moreover, deep disagreements are often followed by deficit attributions from one of the agents to the other, regarding their epistemic understanding, credibility, and motives. Articulating the notions of deep disagreements and deficit attributions, as well as reviewing the complementary concept of epistemic injustice, we have constructed analytical categories that allow us to understand two things: (1) how deficit attributions operate in dialogical contexts of deep disagreements and (2) what types of deficit attributions we can find. We expect that this characterization can serve to analyze citizen–expert dialogues and the pursuit of more modest and inclusive forms of conversation.

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Section: Deep Disagreementsmentioning

confidence: 64%

Analytical categories to describe deficit attributions in deep disagreements between citizens and experts

2021

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“…Personal experience of postgraduate teaching at M and D level at a variety of institutions suggests this to be the case, together with the fact that study skills texts are used in ESRC training programmes, not to mention the popularity of study skill material at undergraduate level. These problems, remarkable in a country that prides itself on having aspirations to take part in the ‘knowledge economy’ are odd, and attest to a deep‐seated failure to successfully teach, not only basic literacy, but also those literary abilities that allow for the understanding of supra‐sentential and meta‐structural features of text in a range of non‐narrative, non‐fictional genres and that involve, in particular, the identification and evaluation of structures of argumentation in the most general sense of transitions from premise to conclusion (‘pc structures’ in Levi's (2000) terms). Such failures are quite fundamental whatever position one takes on the question of whether ‘thinking skills’ are context‐dependent or context‐independent, since it is a presupposition of either position that one has the ability to identify and evaluate a pc structure (Toulmin, 1957; Fisher, 2001).…”

Section: Trying To Attach Sense To ‘Learning How To Learn’mentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning How to Learn: A Critique

Winch

2008

Journal of Philosophy of Education

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The claim that ‘learning how to learn’ is the central ability required for young people to be effective ‘lifelong learners’ is examined for various plausible interpretations. It is vacuous if taken to mean that we need to acquire a capacity to learn, since we necessarily have this if we are to learn anything. The claim that it is a specific ability is then looked at. Once again, if we acquire an ability to learn we do not need the ability to learn how to learn. After noting the implausibility of any such general ability, the paper goes on to examine the claim that certain specific but transferable abilities might satisfy the description ‘learning how to learn’. Various candidates are considered: forming and testing hypotheses and abduction are two promising ones, but each has significant weaknesses. Numeracy and literacy are thought to be more promising, but achievements at the national level leave a lot to be desired, despite the clear advantages for learning of being able to read, write and count. If we needed to learn how to learn before we learned how to read, write and count, it is unlikely that we would get anywhere. Finally, certain non‐cognitive dispositions and character traits rather than cognitive attributes are considered and, drawing on the work of Robert Dearden and others, it is suggested that the development of these aretaic (virtue‐based) and personal qualities rather than cognitive ones may be most decisive for developing independent learning in a range of subject matters.

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“…Are they a priori in us, or developed over time, learned and refined? The developing story of formal logic, from Aristotle to the Stoics to the systems of the twentieth century suggest a developing face of reason, and studies of other cultures, while controversial, may undermine beliefs that even that model of reason is universal (see Levi, 2000). It matters also that this measure of reasonableness is not the logical perspective coming in and stealing the scene.…”

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confidence: 99%

Constrained Maneuvering: Rhetoric as a Rational Enterprise

Tindale

2007

Argumentation

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In Defense of Informal Logic

Cited by 10 publications

References 0 publications

Analytical categories to describe deficit attributions in deep disagreements between citizens and experts

Analytical categories to describe deficit attributions in deep disagreements between citizens and experts

Learning How to Learn: A Critique

Constrained Maneuvering: Rhetoric as a Rational Enterprise

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