In the Aftermath of the Crisis: The EU Administrative System between Impediments and Momentum

Chiti, Edoardo

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2610660

Cited by 3 publications

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“…The Board significantly increases agency powers in decision‐making processes and it alters the nature of agencies' functions in the financial sector, no longer limited to supporting the Commission by drafting technical standards. The progress seems to confirm the dawning of a ‘new era for EU agencies’ (Babis, , p. 266) within a fundamental sector of financial integration: the internal market for banking (Chiti, , p. 16).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…This research note contributes to the fast growing literature discussing agencies within finance (see for instance Chamon, ; Chiti, ; Chiu, ; Weismann, ), and more precisely to the strand focusing on agencies' quasi rule‐making powers and legal/political limits of agency governance (see Babis, ; Busuioc, ; Chamon, ; Simoncini, ). The note extends this research venue to the context of Banking union (BU), concentrating specifically on the Single Resolution Board in order to substantiate the ‘qualitative increase’ (Busuioc, , p. 15) in financial sector agencification , resulting from its establishment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…Backed by the Court of Justice judgment in the ‘ESMA‐Short selling case’, the Board has been placed at the heart of resolution policy‐making (Chiti, , p. 2), elevating agencies' role in promoting financial integration (Babis, , p. 269). Indeed, without making policy choices the Board potentially predefines them, meaning that by exercising some of its competencies the SRB provokes repercussions in Europe's banking system stability, potentially decisive to the development of prudential policy.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the same time the rationale of agencies expanding within the European banking sector complements that of the broader institutional phenomenon of agencification of the EU's political‐administrative order (see for instance Busuioc, ; Busuioc et al ., , Egeberg and Trondal, ; Everson, ; Groenleer, ). Indeed, as a direct response to the global financial crisis the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) were created in 2010, signalling a critical turn to agency governance (Chiti, ). As the first set of agencies within finance, the ESAs recalibrated the exercise of public authority over this sector (Chiu, , p. 67), delegating functions in policy creation processes from EU political institutions (such as the European Commission).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Some Reflections on the Governance Framework of the Single Resolution Board

Beroš

2017

J of Common Market Studies

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First embodied by the European Supervisory Authorities in 2010, agency governance in the financial sector has gained momentum with the creation of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) – an EU agency with considerable competencies in banking prudential policy. Within a short period, backed by the ‘ESMA‐Short Selling case’ judgment, agencies have progressed from supporting the European Commission with their quasi‐rule making, to a more prominent role in the decision‐making process, potentially influencing policy‐makers' agenda. By engaging in a qualitative analysis of legal documents, official texts and relevant scholarship, this research note examines the formal framework and practical aspects of SRB's governance, in order to substantiate whether its establishment presents a ‘qualitative increase’ in financial sector agencification. At the same time, the research note highlights problematic issues arising because of the limitations set by the Meroni doctrine arguing that the Board's wide powers ‘on paper’ may prove challenging to implement in practice.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Some Reflections on the Governance Framework of the Single Resolution Board

Beroš

2017

J of Common Market Studies

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“…2.4. See also Chiti (2015), p. 12 for a discussion of the concerns with the broad interpretation of ESA competencies. 19 See Articles 8(1) and (2), and Article 35(1) of Regulation (EU) No.…”

Section: The Subsidiarity Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

The Algorithmic Future of Insurance Supervision in the EU: A Reality Check

Georgosouli

Okonjo

2022

AIDA Europe Research Series on Insurance Law and Regulation

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Recent developments in FinTech and RegTech marked the EU’s pivot towards a digitally driven Capital Markets Union and a concomitant algorithmic turn in EU financial supervision under the leadership of the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESMA, EBA, EIOPA). Starting from the premise that the EIOPA’s relevant initiatives are driven from the Authority’s normative and institutional environment as well as the perceived technological affordances of RegTech, this chapter provides a ‘reality check’ of the algorithmic future of EU financial supervision in the field of insurance as an aspect of EU financial markets’ governance. On the one hand, it finds that an important blind-spot in the EIOPA’s agenda is the absence of a concrete plan for a system of digital reporting. On the other hand, it examines what it takes to set up a system of digital reporting. To that end, it focuses on three interrelated issues: The technology that will be required to provide the infrastructure of digital reporting and its limitations, difficulties with the conversion of regulatory content into code, and issues of reporting architecture and governance. The ultimate objective of this chapter is to inform the agenda of the digital transformation of EU financial market oversight in anticipation of future challenges while relevant policy and legal debates are still on-going.

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The Interplay between the EBA and the Banking Union

Cappiello¹

2015

SSRN Journal

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In the last five years the European institutional architecture of banking regulation and supervision has undergone sweeping changes, brought about by a number of sequential legislative initiatives. Such a "Copernican revolution" naturally calls for investigating whether and how these different layers of reforms add up to (or can be interpreted in a way that ensure) an overall consistent, efficient and effective design for banking regulation and supervision. This is particularly the case for the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the Banking Union (BU), two new institutional players which in the public debate are sometimes dubbed as overlapping or even conflicting. The paper provides a critical analysis of this interplay and its components, also with the aim to provide food for thought for further exploration, from a private as well as a public law perspective. It starts from the reasons behind the foundation of the EBA and the BU, to show how these new institutional players in fact were created to pursue two distinct and complementary goals, and operate on two separate but interconnected institutional levels. The paper then dwells on the panoply of innovative regulatory tools which the EBA can dispose of in order to accomplish its mission to foster maximum harmonization and the creation of a single set of common rules (the "Single rulebook" or SR): technical standards, guidelines and recommendations, and other "soft law" instruments, such as the Q&A tool. The analysis aims to stimulate further critical thinking on the scope and possible impact of these tools, and their consistency within the overall European framework of legal sources. Hence, the focus moves on the main areas covered by the SR (i.e. prudential rules and resolution) and the priorities followed in its build up, highlighting how these priorities can contribute to the effective functioning of the two current components of the BU, i.e. the SSM and the SRM. The paper concludes with some remarks on areas of possible improvement and development, underlining the need to: i) step up the harmonization of corporate and insolvency laws, given their impact on cross-border banking and cross-border resolution; ii) provide more certainty on the scope and possible effects of EBA's mediation role; iii) rethink the governance of the EBA, if one wants to get to a more balanced interplay between national and European drivers.

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In the Aftermath of the Crisis: The EU Administrative System between Impediments and Momentum

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Some Reflections on the Governance Framework of the Single Resolution Board

Some Reflections on the Governance Framework of the Single Resolution Board

The Algorithmic Future of Insurance Supervision in the EU: A Reality Check

The Interplay between the EBA and the Banking Union

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