Incentive mechanisms based on Minority Games in heterogeneous Delay Tolerant Networks

Chahin, Wissam; Sidi, Habib B. A.; El-Azouzi, Rachid; Pellegrini, Francesco De; Walrand, Jean

doi:10.1109/itc.2013.6662956

Cited by 16 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…In order to overcome lack of feedback, the proposed mechanism assumes that a relay receives a positive reward if and only if it is the first one to deliver the message to the corresponding destination. [17] is a credit-based incentive system using the theory of Minority Games [18] in order to attain coordination in distributed fashion. This mechanism considers the realistic case when the cost for taking part in the forwarding process varies with the devices technology or the users habits.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Design of a Reward-Based Incentive Mechanism for Delay Tolerant Networks

Seregina

Brun

El-Azouzi

et al. 2017

IEEE Trans. on Mobile Comput.

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A central problem in Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) is to persuade mobile nodes to participate in relaying messages. Indeed, the delivery of a message incurs a certain number of costs for a relay. We consider a twohop DTN in which a source node, wanting to get its message across to the destination as fast as possible, promises each relay it meets a reward. This reward is the minimum amount that offsets the expected delivery cost, as estimated by the relay from the information given by the source (number of existing copies of the message, age of these copies). A reward is given only to the relay that is the first one to deliver the message to the destination. We show that under fairly weak assumptions the expected reward the source pays remains the same irrespective of the information it conveys, provided that the type of information does not vary dynamically over time. On the other hand, the source can gain by adapting the information it conveys to a meeting relay. For the particular cases of two relays or exponentially distributed inter-contact times, we give some structural results of the optimal adaptive policy.Index terms -delay tolerant networks, reward incentive mechanism, adaptive strategy *

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Design of a Reward-Based Incentive Mechanism for Delay Tolerant Networks

Seregina

Brun

El-Azouzi

et al. 2017

IEEE Trans. on Mobile Comput.

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“…At each encounter between the source and a mobile that does not have the message, the message is relayed with some probability taking values in U = [u min , u max ] ⊆ [0, 1]. It is worth observing that 0 < u max ≤ 1 is equivalent to a thinning operation of the meeting point process, i.e., assuming λ ′ = u max λ; u min > 0 is required in certain rewarding mechanisms used in order to incentivize relays to take part to the forwarding process [24,25].…”

Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adaptive Optimal Stochastic Control of Delay-Tolerant Networks

Altman¹,

Pellegrini²,

Miorandi³

et al. 2017

IEEE Trans. on Mobile Comput.

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Optimal stochastic control of delay tolerant networks is studied in this paper. First, the structure of optimal two-hop forwarding policies is derived. In order to be implemented, such policies require knowledge of certain global system parameters such as the number of mobiles or the rate of contacts between mobiles. But, such parameters could be unknown at system design time or may even change over time. In order to address this problem, adaptive policies are designed that combine estimation and control: based on stochastic approximation techniques, such policies are proved to achieve optimal performance in spite of lack of global information. Furthermore, the paper studies interactions that may occur in the presence of several DTNs which compete for the access to a gateway node. The latter problem is formulated as a cost-coupled stochastic game and a unique Nash equilibrium is found. Such equilibrium corresponds to the system configuration in which each DTN adopts the optimal forwarding policy determined for the single network problem.

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“…In the work by Hulke and Attar, 7 the authors discussed different game theoretical-inspired incentive mechanisms and analyzed them while pointing out their advantages and drawbacks. Chahin et al 8 propose a fixed rewarding mechanism. To make tradeoff between incentives for cooperation and energy consumption, a Minority Game is constructed.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust fully distributed file caching for delay-tolerant networks: A reward-based incentive mechanism

Ezzahidi

Sabir

Koulali

et al. 2017

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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This article exhibits a reward-based incentive mechanism for file caching in delay-tolerant networks. In delay-tolerant networks, nodes use relay's store-carry-forward paradigm to reach the final destination. Thereby, relay nodes may store data in their buffer and carry it till an appropriate contact opportunity with destination arises. However, the relays are not always willing to assist data forwarding due to a limited energy or a low storage capacity. Our proposal suggests a reward mechanism to uphold and to sustain cooperation among relay nodes. We model this distributed network interaction as a non-cooperative game. Namely, the source node offers to the relay nodes a positive reward if they accept to cache and to forward a given file successfully to a target destination, whereas the relay nodes may either accept or reject the source deal, depending on the reward attractiveness and on their battery status (their actual energy level). Next, full characterizations of both pure and mixed Nash equilibria are provided. Then, we propose three fully distributed algorithms to ensure convergence to the Nash equilibria (for both pure equilibrium and mixed equilibrium). Finally, we validate our proposal through extensive numerical examples and many learning simulations and draw some conclusions and insightful remarks.

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Incentive mechanisms based on Minority Games in heterogeneous Delay Tolerant Networks

Cited by 16 publications

References 11 publications

On the Design of a Reward-Based Incentive Mechanism for Delay Tolerant Networks

On the Design of a Reward-Based Incentive Mechanism for Delay Tolerant Networks

Adaptive Optimal Stochastic Control of Delay-Tolerant Networks

Robust fully distributed file caching for delay-tolerant networks: A reward-based incentive mechanism

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