Incentives for Conformity and Anticonformity

Dvorak, Fabian; Fischbacher, Urs; Schmelz, Katrin

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3754595

Cited by 2 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 77 publications

(90 reference statements)

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“…This example replicates the strategy estimation results of Dvorak, Fischbacher, and Schmelz (2020). The authors study conformity and anticonformity in a binary choice experiment.…”

Section: Replication Of Dvorak Fischbacher and Schmelz 2020supporting

confidence: 73%

“…The experimental design makes it possible to predict the preferred alternative of the individual in this choice. Dvorak et al (2020) find that two-thirds of the participants use a conformist strategy. The conformist strategy generally follows the own preference if the choices of the other group members are in line with the own preference.…”

Section: Replication Of Dvorak Fischbacher and Schmelz 2020mentioning

confidence: 82%

“…R> print(strategies.DFS2020) The data DFS2020 contains the experimental data of Dvorak et al (2020). The variable "choice" of this data set is a factor with two levels.…”

Section: Replication Of Dvorak Fischbacher and Schmelz 2020mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The data also contains two variables which are used by Dvorak et al (2020) as individual level covariates for the selection of strategies. The first variable is an intercept, which is one for every observation.…”

Section: Replication Of Dvorak Fischbacher and Schmelz 2020mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Stratest: Strategy Estimation in R

Dvorak

2020

SSRN Journal

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stratEst is a software package for the estimation of finite mixture models of discrete choice strategies in the statistical computing environment R. Discrete choice strategies can be customized by the user to fit the environment in which choices are made. The parameters of the strategy estimation model describe the behavior of each strategy and how frequent each strategy is in the population. The estimation function of the package uses the expectation maximization algorithm and the Newton-Raphson method to find the maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters. The estimation function can also be used to fit a strategy estimation model with individual level covariates to explain the selection of strategies by individuals. The package contains functions for data processing and simulation, strategy generation, parameter tests, model checking, and model selection.

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“…This example replicates the strategy estimation results of Dvorak, Fischbacher, and Schmelz (2020). The authors study conformity and anticonformity in a binary choice experiment.…”

Section: Replication Of Dvorak Fischbacher and Schmelz 2020supporting

confidence: 73%

Section: Replication Of Dvorak Fischbacher and Schmelz 2020mentioning

confidence: 82%

“…R> print(strategies.DFS2020) The data DFS2020 contains the experimental data of Dvorak et al (2020). The variable "choice" of this data set is a factor with two levels.…”

Section: Replication Of Dvorak Fischbacher and Schmelz 2020mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Replication Of Dvorak Fischbacher and Schmelz 2020mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Stratest: Strategy Estimation in R

Dvorak

2020

SSRN Journal

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“…economists (35)(36)(37)(38)(39)(40)(41). In these models, conformism is an aspect of learning from others in which the likelihood that an individual's behavior will be copied is greater the more frequent that behavior is in the population.…”

Section: Social Sciencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Overcoming COVID-19 vaccination resistance when alternative policies affect the dynamics of conformism, social norms, and crowding out

Schmelz

Bowles

2021

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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What is an effective vaccination policy to end the COVID-19 pandemic? We address this question in a model of the dynamics of policy effectiveness drawing upon the results of a large panel survey implemented in Germany during the first and second waves of the pandemic. We observe increased opposition to vaccinations were they to be legally required. In contrast, for voluntary vaccinations, there was higher and undiminished support. We find that public distrust undermines vaccine acceptance, and is associated with a belief that the vaccine is ineffective and, if enforced, compromises individual freedom. We model how the willingness to be vaccinated may vary over time in response to the fraction of the population already vaccinated and whether vaccination has occurred voluntarily or not. A negative effect of enforcement on vaccine acceptance (of the magnitude observed in our panel or even considerably smaller) could result in a large increase in the numbers that would have to be vaccinated unwillingly in order to reach a herd-immunity target. Costly errors may be avoided if policy makers understand that citizens’ preferences are not fixed but will be affected both by the crowding-out effect of enforcement and by conformism. Our findings have broad policy applicability beyond COVID-19 to cases in which voluntary citizen compliance is essential because state capacities are limited and because effectiveness may depend on the ways that the policies themselves alter citizens’ beliefs and preferences.

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Incentives for Conformity and Anticonformity

Cited by 2 publications

References 77 publications

Stratest: Strategy Estimation in R

Stratest: Strategy Estimation in R

Overcoming COVID-19 vaccination resistance when alternative policies affect the dynamics of conformism, social norms, and crowding out

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