India's RCEP Dilemma with China: Beyond the Legal Texts*

Abstract

The ASEAN‐inaugurated Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was eventually concluded on 15 November 2020 after 8 years of tough negotiations. India was counted as an important member of the RCEP, but it chose to back out when other members were finalizing the RCEP legal text. This article critically analyzes the relevant legal provisions leading to India's withdrawal from this significant mega trade deal, the reasons behind India's refusal of those provisions, the possibility of isolationism India might face, and geopolitical changes in Sino–India relations post stand‐off on the Galwan Valley as well as the COVID‐19 pandemic. It argues that unbalanced economic relations, India's self‐reliant ideology, as well as China's growing hegemony in the Asia‐Pacific region are among the principle factors for India to back out from the RCEP. However, the door to participate in the future remains open for India.

The role of trade liberalization in promoting regional integration and sustainability: The case of regional comprehensive economic partnership

“…China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, and other economic systems of developed countries have participated in this agreement to reduce tariff barriers and build a unified market. Due to severe disagreements in India about whether to open the market to the outside world, this power in South Asia did not ap-prove RCEP (e.g., References [ 67 , 68 ]). So far, Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam have approved the agreement.…”

The path to the construction of a domestic and international dual cycle of China’s shipping industry

“…On the other hand, facing with the challenges brought by the self-reliant ideology (Wang and Sharma, 2021), the network of high-level FTAs shall be expanded further. Not only PRC shall commit itself to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, but also start or keep strategic discussion with other major trade powers such as USA, EU and UK regarding the possibilities of establishing FTAs, promoting the construction of free trade zones among the "Belt and Road" countries, exploring the possibilities of free trade areas with countries in South America, Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa 34 .…”

Way of Authoritarian Regional Hegemon? Formation of the RCEP From the Perspective of China

“…Although literature in this aspect is very thin, some studies highlight how the domestic institutional structure for trade policymaking and electoral systems has influenced the negotiation process and the extent to which each member state prefers to be liberalized (Jiang, 2013; Ravenhill, 2016). Another study of India’s domestic politics on RCEP presents domestic reasons of the country’s decision to withdraw when the other members were finalizing the negotiation (Wang and Sharma, 2021). Despite all potential benefits for India to remain in the RCEP, such as placing constraints on China’s offensive behavior, countering the expansion of China’s influence, and gaining greater bargaining power with China in future territorial disputes and trade frictions by aligning with Japan and Australia in the RCEP, 1 India opted out owing to the huge demands for protection from domestic agriculture and industry, and the trade deficit with certain member states, especially China, and its self-reliant ideology (Ganguly and Gupta, 2020).…”