The rise of the synthetic opioid epidemic has time and time again brought criticism on China and India, the world’s two main producers of fentanyl and its chemical precursors. In the past few years, the two countries have attempted to strengthen regulations over fentanyl production and distribution, though its effects on global drug governance remain under scrutiny. This study used qualitative and comparative methods to investigate the current regulatory landscape for fentanyl, including its efficiency and potential loopholes in China and India. It concludes that although both China and India are actively and significantly attempting to step away from the global fentanyl supply chain, these efforts remain ineffective due to institutional loopholes, namely inadequate legislation and fragmented regulatory structures. From insights gained on global drug governance, we recommend a binding international convention concentrated on controlling fentanyl and its related substances, with further bilateral and multilateral cooperation among states as necessary complementation.

The ASEAN‐inaugurated Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was eventually concluded on 15 November 2020 after 8 years of tough negotiations. India was counted as an important member of the RCEP, but it chose to back out when other members were finalizing the RCEP legal text. This article critically analyzes the relevant legal provisions leading to India's withdrawal from this significant mega trade deal, the reasons behind India's refusal of those provisions, the possibility of isolationism India might face, and geopolitical changes in Sino–India relations post stand‐off on the Galwan Valley as well as the COVID‐19 pandemic. It argues that unbalanced economic relations, India's self‐reliant ideology, as well as China's growing hegemony in the Asia‐Pacific region are among the principle factors for India to back out from the RCEP. However, the door to participate in the future remains open for India.