Individual Characteristics, Administration Preferences and Corruption: Evidence from Chinese Local Government Officials’ Work Experience

Abstract

The Chinese corruption beyond the pressure-style fiscal decentralization system is largely dominated by the preferred duty performances decided by local political authorities. By designing a natural experiment about whether the officials leave their positions or not, the research combines the methods as difference-in-difference model and system generalized method of moments to explore the inter-correlation of the provincial party committee secretary's individual character, administration preferences and local corruption level in 30 provinces from 2000-2013 in China. The results show us that the exchange in different places and cross appointment for provincial party committee secretaries will be able to strength the anti-corruption mechanism; meanwhile, the intellectual officers and young and middle-aged chief leaders are more likely to carry on the shortterm encouraging policy. They are good at using their own employee experiences to encourage the officers from each level to form an "increasing-style promoting competition" order. The current Chinese anti-corruption strategy has obvious space-club effect and path dependence effect. In addition, the corruption attached to regional-scale can be gradually eliminated through the transfer of consumptive governmental expenses, fiscal decentralization reform, and continuous urbanization, enlarging the open areas. However, the lower corruption degree areas as west and middle areas may be trapped into another round of corruption as a result of the environment-sacrifice investment policies, which are caused by the employment expansion plan led by local leaders.

Determinants of corruption pressures on local government in the E.U.

“…Further, its gender-sensitivity confirms the arguments of women being more corruption risk averse (Barnes & Beaulieu, 2019;Rivas, 2013). In contrast to other studies for transition countries (Luo & Duan, 2016) the new, younger generations of councillors in PTCs seem to have more anti-corruption awareness, regardless of the size of financial capacity of their local community.…”

“…Past research on education and corruption nexus indicated that in societies with low prevalence of corruption, education attainment increases institutional trust and that 'effect of education is conditional upon the pervasiveness of public sector corruption' (Hakhverdian & Mayne, 2012, p. 747). Luo and Duan (2016) showed in case of China there was a link between individual characteristics of local officials and regional corruption incidence whereas higher education, seniority and experience of local officials made them more anti-corruption oriented. As Mangafi c and Veselinovi c (2020) showed for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the higher educated individuals will more likely engage in bribing.…”

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“…Optimizing individual human resources is an effort to achieve healthy institutional targets [39]. According to Van Metter and van Horn [34], humans are the most important resource in determining the success of the policy implementation process.…”

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“…Optimizing individual human resources aims to achieve healthy institutional targets (Luo & Duan, 2016). According to Van Metter and van Horn (1975), human is an essential resource in determining the success of the policy implementation process.…”