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The Chinese corruption beyond the pressure-style fiscal decentralization system is largely dominated by the preferred duty performances decided by local political authorities. By designing a natural experiment about whether the officials leave their positions or not, the research combines the methods as difference-in-difference model and system generalized method of moments to explore the inter-correlation of the provincial party committee secretary's individual character, administration preferences and local corruption level in 30 provinces from 2000-2013 in China. The results show us that the exchange in different places and cross appointment for provincial party committee secretaries will be able to strength the anti-corruption mechanism; meanwhile, the intellectual officers and young and middle-aged chief leaders are more likely to carry on the shortterm encouraging policy. They are good at using their own employee experiences to encourage the officers from each level to form an "increasing-style promoting competition" order. The current Chinese anti-corruption strategy has obvious space-club effect and path dependence effect. In addition, the corruption attached to regional-scale can be gradually eliminated through the transfer of consumptive governmental expenses, fiscal decentralization reform, and continuous urbanization, enlarging the open areas. However, the lower corruption degree areas as west and middle areas may be trapped into another round of corruption as a result of the environment-sacrifice investment policies, which are caused by the employment expansion plan led by local leaders.

Under the influence of industrialization and rapid population growth after World War II, urban sprawl, central cities' recession and metropolis diseases have become three tumors that restricted urban sustainable development in western countries, so the new urbanism has arisen. From garden city to smart growth, new urbanism thoughts have experienced long-term evolution. Diversification, compactness, public transportation and social integration advocated by new urbanism have been supported by the majority of people. The paper illustrates, in detail, the evolution and management of new urbanism.

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This paper follows fiscal federalism that a higher degree of fiscal decentralization is always associated with lower corruption and income inequality. There exists a stronger dynamic relationship among fiscal decentralization, corruption and income inequality in developing countries. Based on the panel dataset from 1999 to 2012, this research is focusing on China, showing that it does not exist a simple linear relationship among fiscal decentralization, corruption and urban-rural income inequality, instead, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and urban-rural income inequality is more in line with a specific "U" shape. While the effect of corruption on urban-rural income inequality, it can be gradually weakened as the reform of fiscal decentralization which expands the existed researches made by Mah (2013) and Lessmann (2010).