Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly

Nese, Gjermund; Straume, Odd Rune

doi:10.1007/s10842-006-0001-7

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Hence, the Deardorff and Rajaraman (2009) explanation for export restrictions is potentially mitigated by seller concentration. The present results are related to work on strategic trade policy and industry concentration by Long and Soubeyran (1997), De Santis (2000), Nese and Straume (2007), and Deardorff and Rajaraman (2009), and of course more broadly to the extensive strategic trade policy literature developed following Krugman (1979) and Brander and Spencer (1985). 2…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 53%

Buyer and Seller Concentration in Global Commodity Markets

Oladi¹,

Gilbert²

2012

Review Development Economics

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In recent years there has been an increased incidence of export restrictions applied by developing countries to commodities and raw materials. Commodity markets may be characterized by concentration on the buyer side, with a small number of transnational intermediary firms purchasing from supplying countries and distributing to the market, and recent work has suggested that export taxes may be an optimal policy to recapture monopsony rent. However, in many commodity markets there are also a limited number of large supplying countries. This paper considers a situation where an oligopsonistic intermediary industry purchases from a small number of supplying countries, the governments of which act strategically in their policy choices both with respect to the intermediaries and any competing suppliers. In the resulting two-stage game, the paper shows that an export subsidy, rather than an export tax, may arise as the optimal intervention.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 53%

Buyer and Seller Concentration in Global Commodity Markets

Oladi¹,

Gilbert²

2012

Review Development Economics

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“…Gabriel and Smeers (2006) provide a survey of the earlier literature. More recent studies, like Nese and Straume (2007), assume a successive oligopoly. We extend these models to take into account buying power using the bilateral contracting approach laid out previously.…”

Section: Calibrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade Quotas and Buyer Power, With an Application to the E.U. Natural Gas Market

Ikonnikova

Zwart

2014

Journal of the European Economic Association

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We consider a market in which domestic buyers negotiate contracts with foreign sellers, and explore how trade quotas can help to increase the buyers' countervailing power. We use the Shapley value to describe bargaining power and the distribution of the trade surplus in such a bilateral oligopoly. By exploiting strategic externalities among the buyers, bilateral trade quotas can improve the buyers' bargaining positions. In contrast, aggregate trade restrictions on all buyers' trade never improve buyer surplus. Minimum quotas on imports from fringe suppliers can benefit nonaffected buyers, as these enjoy positive externalities. We apply these insights to the E.U. market for natural gas and show that the effects of trade quotas on E.U. gas importers' power can be significant.

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“…1 1 Several studies have discussed policy implications of an export subsidy or tax in vertically related markets; see for instance, Ishikawa and Spencer (1999) and Nese and Straume (2007). In this paper, our focus is on vertical integration. …”

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confidence: 99%

Vertical Integration Toward an Export-Oriented Industry*

Chen

Hwang

2012

Japanese Economic Review

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The literature on vertical integration has constantly assumed a linear demand for the final good market. In this paper, we instead assume the demand to be a general one and use it to derive the welfare effect of vertical integration toward an export‐oriented industry. It is shown that the effect of vertical integration on the intermediate good price depends on the curvature of the derived demand curve. Moreover, vertical integration is welfare‐improving only if it increases the price of the intermediate good.

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Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly

Cited by 4 publications

References 37 publications

Buyer and Seller Concentration in Global Commodity Markets

Buyer and Seller Concentration in Global Commodity Markets

Trade Quotas and Buyer Power, With an Application to the E.U. Natural Gas Market

Vertical Integration Toward an Export-Oriented Industry*

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