Information, Bias, and Mediation Success

Savun, Burcu

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00490.x

Cited by 146 publications

(131 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…This agrees exactly with our argument that while bilateral cheap talk, as measured by the communication variable, and procedural, directive and exogenously informed mediation, as measured by the arbitration-conciliation variable, can be effective, information mediation without independent knowledge should not be effective. Therefore, we would argue that this result combined with the results of Bercovitch & Houston (1996), Quinn et al (2009), Savun (2008, and others mentioned above forms a compelling body of evidence that our theoretical insight into the general difficulty of information mediators helping countries end their disputes is empirically plausible.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 60%

“…Even stronger support can be found in recent empirical work by Savun (2008). Her article distinguishes itself from previous work on mediation by focusing on the kind of information that mediators possess.…”

Section: Analysis Of Information Mediation In Disputesmentioning

confidence: 85%

“…On one side, there is a significant body of work on mediation (e.g., Bercovitch (1986), Beardsley (2008), Savun (2008)) that consistently finds that facilitation-communication mediation (what we call information mediation) is the least effective type of mediation for settling disputes. Furthermore, Savun (2008) shows with a clearer measure of a mediator's outside information that mediators are effective to the extent that they have access to high quality outside information. In a closely related literature, however, mediation is shown to be positively associated with the peaceful settlement and de-escalation of international disputes.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute? Information Sharing through Mediation

Fey¹,

Ramsay²

2010

World Pol.

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We study the conflict mediation problem, sometimes called "shuttle diplomacy," when the mediator acts as a go-between and must gather information from the disputants. In the context of a general model of information mediation, we show that the incentive that disputants have to lie to the mediator undoes any advantage that might be gained by adding communication with a third party. In fact, our main result shows that any equilibrium outcome that is achievable through mediation is also achievable as an equilibrium outcome of a game with unmediated pre-play communication. This is true even when the mediator is allowed to have arbitrary preferences or biases. We then test our empirical prediction on dispute management efforts between 1937 and 1985. The analysis supports the hypothesis that information mediation has no effect in environments where the mediator has no independent source of information.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 60%

Section: Analysis Of Information Mediation In Disputesmentioning

confidence: 85%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute? Information Sharing through Mediation

Fey¹,

Ramsay²

2010

World Pol.

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“…A possible explanation for this can be that biased third parties are more willing to step in to counterbalance one side in the kind of asymmetrical situations that characterize civil wars (Svensson 2006). This finding has implications for management outcomes, as research shows biased third parties are more likely to resolve conflicts than unbiased ones in both civil wars (Savun 2005) and interstate conflicts (Favretto 2009). …”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 84%

Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars

Melin

Svensson

2009

International Interactions

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This paper examines the conditions under which warring parties will accept an outside party's offer to mediate. Specifically, we explore variation in the incentives for accepting third-party offers in interstate conflicts as compared to civil wars. We argue that since mediation in civil wars transfers legitimacy to the non-state actor and can generate a precedent of exceptions to the norm of sovereignty, the political cost associated with accepting international mediation will be substantially higher in civil wars compared to international conflicts. States should therefore only accept mediation in the most serious disputes, or when the costs of legitimizing an opponent are outweighed by the benefits of conflict resolution. Building on this theoretical reasoning, the paper analyzes the implications of differences in incentive structures between inter-and intrastate conflicts for offer and acceptance of mediation. We find an empirical discrepancy between interstate and civil wars in regard to demand-side (acceptance) of mediation, and to a somewhat lesser extent the supply-side (offer) of international mediation. In line with our argument, we find that the historical ties between the potential intermediary and at least one of the disputants play different roles in regard to acceptance of mediation in interstate compared to civil wars. This is important to take into consideration in the emerging debate on mediation bias.

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“…In light of the cheap talk problem, some studies in the literature have considered the need for bias (Kydd 2003;Savun 2008), impartiality (Favretto 2009;Kydd 2006;Rauchhaus 2006), leverage (Beardsley, Quinn, Biswas and Wilkenfeld 2006;Bercovitch and Gartner 2006;Favretto 2009;Smith and Stam 2003;Wilkenfeld, Young, Quinn and Asal 2005) or legally binding resolution (Gent and Shannon 2010;Mitchell and Hensel 2007).…”

Section: Cheap Talkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The UN at the peacemaking–peacebuilding nexus

Beardsley

2013

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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The UN Security Council (UNSC) confronts at least three challenges in translating its actions during armed conflict into more durable peace after conflict. First, heavy-handed interventions such as military deployments and sanctions can impede the ability of the disputants to identify and reach a self-sustaining settlement when there is insufficient follow-through. Second, coordination problems can arise in handing off peacemaking activities from actors in the Secretariat to the UNSC when post-conflict security guarantees and continuous engagement are needed. Third, explicit attempts by the UNSC to produce peace and stability make it susceptible to the problem of cheap talk when it proclaims its concerns. After characterizing these problems in theory and generating observable implications, the paper uses original data on UNSC resolutions to test the hypotheses. The results indicate that the UN can succeed as a short-term peacemaker, particularly when it relies on diplomatic engagement and sanctions. However, when there is not adequate follow-through in the form of peacekeeping, the UN struggles to improve the long-term prospects of peace in part because it tends to promote stop-gap ceasefire resolutions. With peacekeeping, active UN involvement during conflict can promote long-term stability. Half measures such as condemnations have little effect on the stability of peace.

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Information, Bias, and Mediation Success

Cited by 146 publications

References 59 publications

When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute? Information Sharing through Mediation

When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute? Information Sharing through Mediation

Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars

The UN at the peacemaking–peacebuilding nexus

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