Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics

Most, Benjamin A.; Starr, Harvey

doi:10.2307/j.ctv6wgjzn

Cited by 111 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Within my explanatory framework, I seek to integrate the existing knowledge from the space literature into a more cohesive account capable of explaining differential levels of space engagement. My explanation focuses mainly on the role of national capabilities, but also incorporates the factors affecting states' political willingness to invest in space (see Most and Starr ). I argue that states' capacity to pursue civil space capabilities is highly dependent upon their economic resources, their levels of scientific and technical (S&T) human capital, their possession of military rocketry R&D programs and long‐range ballistic missile (LRBM) arsenals, and civil space agencies.…”

Section: Explaining the Proliferation Of Space Programs And Capabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the Final Frontier: An Empirical Analysis of Global Civil Space Proliferation

Early

2013

Int Stud Q

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While space capabilities were once concentrated among a handful of leading powers, an increasingly large number of states have gained access to them. As of 2007, 58 countries possessed dedicated civil space programs, 44 countries had placed nationally owned satellites into orbit, and 9 countries had achieved domestic space launch capabilities. To date, however, no systematic inquiries have ever been conducted into which countries acquire space capabilities and why. Within this paper, I develop an explanatory account that explores the capacity-based factors and political motivations that influence countries' acquisition of space capabilities. I test my hypotheses via a quantitative analysis of the factors affecting 143 countries' acquisition of civil space programs, satellite capabilities, and space launch capabilities from 1950 to 2002. My findings shed new light on the primary causes of the proliferation of civil space capabilities and yield a number of important policy implications.

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Section: Explaining the Proliferation Of Space Programs And Capabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the Final Frontier: An Empirical Analysis of Global Civil Space Proliferation

Early

2013

Int Stud Q

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“…We also employ several control variables in our analyses, most of which borrow directly from the studies conducted by Fordham () and Foster (). We include three dyadic indicators that previous scholarship has expected to decrease the general likelihood of conflict— Joint Democracy (here, the POLITY IV score for the other state in the dyad; Maoz and Russett ; Marshall and Jaggers ), Contiguity (which is decreasing in temporal proximity; Most and Starr ; Bennett and Stam ), and Relative Power (Bremer ; Mitchell and Prins ). As (unlike the WEIS models) the MID models are analyzing all states beyond rivalry, we control for discordant interests in the latter by including Signorino and Ritter's () “S” Preference Similarity Score .…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Don't Tread on Me: Constraint‐Challenging Presidents and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

Keller¹,

Foster²

2016

Pres Stud Q

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Recent research demonstrates that U.S. presidents’ psychological predispositions influence the frequency with which they choose diversionary foreign policy strategies. The purpose of this article is to extend the expectations of this “first‐image” theory of diversion to the strategic behavior of potential diversionary targets. We posit that U.S. presidents whose spontaneous public rhetoric indicates a willingness to challenge pacifying constraints should be viewed by potential enemies as more likely to engage in diversionary conflict. Building upon the “strategic conflict avoidance” perspective, we expect that when such presidents encounter diversionary incentives, other states will increase cooperation toward and avoid initiation of military disputes against the United States. Time‐series analyses of behavior toward the United States for the period 1953–2000 largely bear out this expectation, as interstate rivals increase cooperation toward, and all states decrease militarized incident initiation against, the United States when economic misery is high and presidents whose rhetoric has revealed a proclivity for challenging constraints are in office.

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“…This argument was initially proposed by Most & Starr (1989) who distinguish between "opportunity" and "willingness". Having military capabilities creates the opportunity to resolve latent conflicts through the use of force.…”

Section: Arms Imports and The Feasibility Of Forcementioning

confidence: 99%

The build-up of coercive capacities

Pamp

Rudolph

Thurner

et al. 2018

Journal of Peace Research

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Do governments’ military build-ups foster the outbreak of intrastate violence? This article investigates the impact of governments’ arms imports on the onset of intrastate conflicts. There is scant empirical research on the role of the external acquisition of coercive technologies, and even fewer studies explore the respective causal mechanisms of their consequences. We argue that the existing literature has not adequately considered the potential simultaneity between conflict initiation and arms purchases. In contrast, our study explicitly takes into account that weapon inflows may not only causally induce conflicts but may themselves be caused by conflict anticipation. Following a review of applicable theoretical models to derive our empirical expectations, we offer two innovative approaches to surmount this serious endogeneity problem. First, we employ a simultaneous equations model that allows us to estimate the concurrent effects of both arms imports on conflict onsets and conflict onsets on imports. Second, we are the first to use an instrumental variable approach that uses the import of weapon types not suitable for intrastate conflict as instruments for weapon imports that are relevant for fighting in civil wars. Relying on arms transfer data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for the period 1949-2013, we provide estimates for the effect of imports on civil war onset. Our empirical results clearly show that while arms imports are not a genuine cause of intrastate conflicts, they significantly increase the probability of an onset in countries where conditions are notoriously conducive to conflict. In such situations, arms are not an effective deterrent but rather spark conflict escalation.

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Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics

Cited by 111 publications

References 7 publications

Exploring the Final Frontier: An Empirical Analysis of Global Civil Space Proliferation

Exploring the Final Frontier: An Empirical Analysis of Global Civil Space Proliferation

Don't Tread on Me: Constraint‐Challenging Presidents and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

The build-up of coercive capacities

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