Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms

Che, Jiahua; Qian, Yingyi

doi:10.1162/003355398555658

Cited by 260 publications

(146 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

137

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…While Qian (1999Qian ( , 2001 argues that China's non-standard institutions and suit this transition period in which standard mechanisms are not available, because they provide incentives for economic agents to innovate and to compete and provide enough benefits to those in power so that they do not preclude the reform process, and thus they are the "second best." Che andQian (1998a, 1998b) and Jin and…”

Section: Law Finance and Economic Growthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparing China's Financial System

Allen

Qian

2003

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We compare China's financial system to those of the developed countries, in particular, the US system dominated by financial markets, and the German system dominated by the banking sector. We examine financial systems' properties, including risk sharing, information provision, funding new and mature industries, financial crisis, corporate governance, and the relation between the financial and legal systems and economic growth. We find that there are many fundamental differences between China's financial system and the US system, and simply adopting the US system is not optimal. Understanding the German system and reform China's banking system should be as important as developing US-style financial markets. Our findings also suggest that China differs from most countries studied in the law, finance, and growth and comparative financial systems literature: Despite its poor legal and financial systems, it has the largest, and one of the fastest growing economies in the world. We find that there are effective, informal financing channels and governance mechanisms to support the growth of various firms in the economy. Therefore, it may be best for China to develop its existing financial system, and to ensure that the informal financing channels and governance mechanisms continue to work along with the development of the legal and financial systems.JEL Classifications: G0, P5, O5, K0.

show abstract

Section: Law Finance and Economic Growthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparing China's Financial System

Allen

Qian

2003

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Most of the literature put Township and Village Enterprises together and call them TVEs, although TEs and VEs have some fundamental differences. To have a better understanding of China's TVEs, see Che and Qian (1998), Chen and Rozelle (1995), Putterman (1997) and Walder (1995). 4 Private firms in the sample are those firms that had never been government-owned.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…9 Since we have only one firm, the normalized buyout price and buyout price are the same thing. Both the official and the manager care only about their own benefits.…”

Section: Screening Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Insider Privatization with a Tail: The Buyout Price and Performance of Privatized Firms in Rural China

Rozelle

2003

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper studies insider privatization in transition economies. We show theoretically that the underperformance of insider-privatized firms could be due to the manager-cum-owner's lack of incentives after privatization. A screening theory predicts that a firm's postprivatization incentives increase with the firm's buyout price. The empirical results show that the buyout price decreases with the degree of information asymmetry and that a firm's postprivatization performance increases with the buyout price. We also find that the performance of premium-paying firms converges with that of private firms after privatization; in contrast, heavily discounted firms perform indistinguishably from government-owned firms.

show abstract

“…Issue d'un questionnement autour des droits de propriété, de la nature de la firme (Grossman et Hart, 1986;Hart et Moore, 1990;Hart, 1995) et de son organisation interne (Stole et Zwiebel, 1996;Rajan et Zingales, 1998, la théorie des contrats incomplets se retrouve maintenant dans l'analyse de la structure financière de la firme (Aghion et Bolton, 1992;Zingales, 1998), en économie du travail (Malcomson, 1997), en économie de la santé (Ellis et McGuire, 1990), en économie internationale (Thomas et Worall, 1994), en économie politique (Che et Quian, 1998), en économie de la réglementation (Schmidt, 1996;Hart et al, 1997;Bös, 1999aBös, et 1999b, et même en macroécono-mie (Caballero et Hammour, 1996;Acemoglu et Shimer, 1999). Cette théorie avance des propositions réfutables (Whinston, 2001), qu'un certain nombre de travaux en économétrie des contrats (Woodruff, 2002;Baker et Hubbard, 2003) et en économie expérimentale (Fehr et al, 2001;Sloof et al, 2004) ont cherché à valider.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Quels fondements à l’incomplétude des contrats?

Farès

2006

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Se situant dans le droit fil de la récente controverse sur les fondements de la théorie des contrats incomplets (Maskin et Tirole, 1999 ; Hart et Moore, 1999 ; Tirole, 1999), cette revue de la littérature cherche à définir la notion d’incomplétude contractuelle et à en comprendre l’origine. Deux résultats importants sont dégagés : (i) les raisons traditionnellement avancées pour expliquer l’incomplétude contractuelle, telles que l’indescriptibilité des contingences futures ou l’asymétrie d’information entre les parties contractantes, ne sont pas forcément pertinentes ; (ii) la contrainte d’invérifiabilité, concept clé de la théorie des contrats incomplets, parvient à rendre compte d’un choix d’incomplétude lorsqu’elle est couplée à la contrainte de renégociation du contrat initial. Cette double contrainte permet à la théorie des contrats incomplets de générer un choix endogène d’incomplétude. Plus précisément, cette théorie montre que l’on peut définir un choix de contrat incomplet comme une forme limite du contrat complet.Following the recent controversy on the foundations of incomplete contract theory (Maskin and Tirole, 1999; Hart and Moore, 1999; Tirole, 1999), this survey aims at defining the very nature and origin of the contract incompleteness. Two main results are shown: (i) reasons usually advanced to explain incompleteness, such as the indescribability of future contingencies or the asymmetric information between the contracting parties, are not necessarily relevant; (ii) coupled with the constraint of initial contract renegotiation, the unverifiability constraint, a key notion in incomplete contract theory, allows to derive an endogenous choice of incompleteness. More precisely, incomplete contract theory shows that an incomplete contract can be defined as a limit form of a complete contract

show abstract

Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms

Cited by 260 publications

References 11 publications

Comparing China's Financial System

Comparing China's Financial System

Insider Privatization with a Tail: The Buyout Price and Performance of Privatized Firms in Rural China

Quels fondements à l’incomplétude des contrats?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About