Institutions, Climate Change, and the Foundations of Long-term Policymaking

Abstract

Many policy problems require taking costly action today for future benefits. Examining the case of climate change, this paper examines how two institutions, electoral rules and interest group intermediation, structure distributional politics, and as a result drive variation in climate “policy investments” across the high-income democracies. Proportional electoral rules increase electoral safety, allowing politicians to impose short-term costs on voters. Concertation between industry and the state enables governments to compensate losers, defusing organized opposition to policy change. Moreover, the joint presence of both institutions generates complementarities that reinforce their independent effects, pushing countries onto different climate politics trajectories. Newly available data on climate policy stringency provides support for the arguments. Countries with PR and interest group concertation have the highest levels of policy stringency and distribute higher costs toward consumers. The analysis points to causal mechanisms that should structure responses to a more general set of long-term challenges.

Drivers of Carbon Price Adoption in Wealthy Democracies: International or Domestic Forces?

“…A state’s ability to enact carbon prices can also depend on its domestic political institutions, “understood as the path-dependent rules of the game that shape and constrain actor behavior” (Amable et al 2019:438) and inherent capacities (Meckling and Nahm 2018a, 2018b). Some scholars cite parliamentary systems (Dolsak 2001) or proportional representation (Finnegan 2019; Harrison 2010) as assisting the outcome of state climate action. These political systems support the increased presence of green or left parties, which are also linked to supporting more proclimate outcomes (Christoff and Eckersley 2011; Harrison 2012; Tobin 2017; Vasseur 2014, 2016).…”

Europe’s green, digital and demographic transition: a social policy research perspective

“…In this respect we see some fruitful directions for future research on aspects of corporatist institutions and concertation processes more likely to embrace carbon-neutral-policy losers into decision-making and sustain long-term (often incremental) industrial transition (e.g. in countries with strong corporatist networks; see Finnegan, 2022;Mildenberger, 2020). By contrast, in liberal market economies that foster greater interest pluralism (Hall and Soskice, 2001), strong distributive conflict sets barriers to a steady, long-term transition policy path.…”

“…This is crucial given that legislature periods are of short duration (no longer than four or five years), while restoring ecosystem resilience and attaining a carbon-neutral Europe need actions and investments to be sustained for much longer periods of time. Hence, developing wide societal support for environmental policies is crucial, especially as such policies exhibit a unique distributional profile with short-term costs not being matched with immediate and visible benefits to society (Finnegan, 2022). In this respect we see some fruitful directions for future research on aspects of corporatist institutions and concertation processes more likely to embrace carbon-neutral-policy losers into decision-making and sustain long-term (often incremental) industrial transition (e.g.…”

“…By contrast, in liberal market economies that foster greater interest pluralism (Hall and Soskice, 2001), strong distributive conflict sets barriers to a steady, long-term transition policy path. Policy change is often disruptive, and policy reversals are more likely, due to public conflict (Finnegan, 2022: 10–13). Mapping out such institutional interdependencies can provide useful insights for social partner strategies.…”

The Power of Youth: Political Impacts of the "Fridays for Future" Movement

“…Despite the ever more visible consequences of human-induced climate change (IPCC, 2014), 1 politicians still regularly shy away from implementing long-term benecial climate mitigation measures, fearing the short-term costs involved may hurt their reelection chances (Finnegan, 2022).…”