Proceedings of the 2017 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy 2017
DOI: 10.1145/3140241.3140248
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Integrating Design and Data Centric Approaches to Generate Invariants for Distributed Attack Detection

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
14
0

Year Published

2019
2019
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
4
4

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 15 publications
(14 citation statements)
references
References 10 publications
0
14
0
Order By: Relevance
“…movement of the piston towards the initial position. Attack 2 immediately sets x to 0; since the pressure on the electro-pneumatic controller is 0, piston moves in direction from the initial position (7).…”
Section: B Case Study 2 -Electro-pneumatic Positioning Systemmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…movement of the piston towards the initial position. Attack 2 immediately sets x to 0; since the pressure on the electro-pneumatic controller is 0, piston moves in direction from the initial position (7).…”
Section: B Case Study 2 -Electro-pneumatic Positioning Systemmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…and design-centric (use an analytical model of the process and its control algorithms) [7]. An example of designcentric approach that utilizes a considered CPS model for attack detection and identification is presented in [8].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Early works have considered the case in which the attacker has full knowledge about the system, but has the ability to hack only a limited number of sensors [171,172,176]. In this situation, a relevant research problem is the one of constructing a valid FDIA by minimizing the number of attacked sensors, which has been solved using mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) [178], matching pursuit [172] or [192,193,198,[205][206][207][208][209][210]296] strategies Other approaches [162,163,190,191,194,[199][200][201][297][298][299][300][301] least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) [177]. Later research has established that it is possible for an attacker to launch valid FDIAs even with incomplete information about the system.…”
Section: Theoretical Research On Constructing Fdiasmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many detectionbased approaches rely on state-based invariants to identify deviations of the plant from its normal behavior. Since this deviation is an anomaly, such approaches are referred to as anomaly-based, and can be divided roughly into two categories: design-centric (DeC) and data-centric (DaC) [205]. In DeC approaches, plant design and component specifications are input to an invariant generator, which uses fundamental laws of physics to generate invariants.…”
Section: Defensive Research On Fdiasmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Deception attacks detection represents a challenging task, and a number of different techniques for solving this issue were recently proposed. All these techniques can be classified into two groups: (1) data-centric and (2) design-centric [7]. Data-centric techniques use collected system data, while design-centric techniques are based on system analytical model and its control algorithms.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%