Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others

Abstract

To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? Conversely, to what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this novel and provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defense of the reliability of one's faculties, methods, and opinions that does not beg the question. Moreover, he shows how this account of intellectual self-trust can be used to understand the degree to which it is reasonable to rely on alternative authorities, as well as the degree to which it is reasonable for one's current opinions to be at odds with one's past or future opinions. This book will be of interest to advanced students and professionals working in the fields of philosophy and the social sciences as well as anyone looking for a unified account of the issues at the center of intellectual trust.

Disagreement and the value of self-trust

“…For more narrowly epistemological discussions of self-trust, see e.g. Lehrer (1997) and Foley (2001).…”

Las limitaciones de la evidencia

“…[5] Sobre todo si se relaciona, con Foley (2004), la idea de que el objetivo de las creencias es satisfacer nuestros propios objetivos intelectuales con el carácter internista del evidencialismo.…”

Guest Editor's Introduction

“…Building on his recent work on self-trust (Foley 2001), he argues that intellectual trust of others is, generally speaking, rational because it is a reasonable extension of self-trust. The reasonableness is based on an assessment that people are more similar than they are different; so that, in general, whatever reasons one has for trusting oneself apply towards trusting others.…”