Interest Groups and Theories of Power in America

Abstract

Three models of interest groups, power and political process in America are contrasted: (1) the Truman-Dahl-Lindblom pluralism of the 1960s; (2) the unfinished plural elitism of the 1970s, a theory emphasizing special-interest capture of policy systems whose most influential exponent is Lowi; (3) the ‘triadic’ model of process set forth by Wilson in The Politics of Regulation. The triadic model assumes the normality in policy systems of organized economic producers being challenged by the countervailing power of other organized interests, while state agencies act autonomously. It is argued that the triadic model is the most advanced of the three, although it still needs development. Eighteen illustrative propositions are presented in terms of triadic power. These include relationships among interest groups and state autonomy, ‘high polities’ and routine politics, and types of coalitions in policy systems. Other propositions describe links to possible cycles between triadic power and plural elitism, to corporatist decision-making, and to the ‘resource mobilization’ theory of social movements.

Validating the Comparative Network Framework in a Canada/United States Context

“…This, in and of itself, is part of the justification for work on potentially useful typologies in this field of study. These approaches in the literature represent the field of inter-organizational theory (Hanf and Scharpf 1978;Mandell 1988), evolved interest group theories (Heclo 1978;Jordan and Maloney 1997;McFarland 1987), and an expanded view of the actors in policy development (Blom-Hansen 1997;Klijn 1997;Marsh 1998;Peters 1998). 3.…”

Mastering national contextual challenges: the institutionalisation of LPO and Greenpeace France compared

“…Both resource mobilisation-and policy-oriented activities contribute to EMOs' capacities for action, whose development responds either to perceived opportunities or to requests from potential allies -media, bystander-publics, or public departments seeking support and countervailing pressure (McFarland 1987), interest groups, and other SMOs -thereby serving EMO goals in the political arena. Developing these capacities may in turn spur on organisational change, since it involves mobilising resources, and consequently having to arbitrate on goals.…”

The Role of Interested Groups in England's Emerging Tourism Policy Network

“…Institutions have the power to either set an agenda or to keep issues off an agenda, or to interpret issues in such a way that are innocuous to the network. In further assessing this landscape of group activity within an institutional setting, McFarland (1987) suggests, that one can identify a triad of interests comprising producer groups, countervailing groups and fairly autonomous state agencies. It is, Bentley (1967) claims, the interface of these groupings that take up much of the policy management time and effort of government.…”

“…The structure of diverse organisations, each with some common aims, but different means of achieving them lends itself to such an approach. Thus far, the network can be seen as triaxial in nature as proposed by McFarland (1987) when discussing group activity in the policy-making processes. The three axes are the producer interests (trade and umbrella groups), a fairly autonomous state (government departments, ETC and regional boards) and resource management focused public sector groups.…”