Neopluralism is one of a class of research findings or social science models-such as elitism, pluralism, and corporatism-that refer to the structure of power and policy making in some domain of public policy. Originating from Robert Dahl's pluralism model in Who Governs? (1961), neopluralism evolved in the study of American politics through discarding or modifying some of Dahl's ideas, while adding new concerns about agenda building, the logic of collective action, special-interest subgovernments, social movements, advocacy coalitions, and the theory of political processes. Neopluralism is normally a finding of complex action in policy systems, but neopluralism does not assume that complexity implies fairness of representation, nor does it assume interest group elimination of autonomous action by governmental agencies.

This article seeks to delineate a general theory of interest-group dynamics in America since 1890. Interest groups are seen to act in issue areas which cycle through phases of business control to reform activity and back again. Economic producer groups have a more stable incentive to participate in issue-area decision making than the reform groups that challenge their control. However, after a few years of the business-control phase of the cycle, unchecked producer groups tend to commit ‘excesses’, violations of widely shared values. This leads to political participation by reformers, most of whom lose interest in issue-area participation after a few years. Across the scope of hundreds of issue areas, business control or reform phases tend to occur at the same time. This is an important cause of similar cycles in the politics of the entire system, as described by such writers as Samuel Huntington, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr and Albert Hirschman. Interest-group cycles theory is based on critical pluralism, a new outlook that incorporates concepts of collective-action paradoxes, business power and social movements into interest-group studies.

Three models of interest groups, power and political process in America are contrasted: (1) the Truman-Dahl-Lindblom pluralism of the 1960s; (2) the unfinished plural elitism of the 1970s, a theory emphasizing special-interest capture of policy systems whose most influential exponent is Lowi; (3) the ‘triadic’ model of process set forth by Wilson in The Politics of Regulation. The triadic model assumes the normality in policy systems of organized economic producers being challenged by the countervailing power of other organized interests, while state agencies act autonomously. It is argued that the triadic model is the most advanced of the three, although it still needs development. Eighteen illustrative propositions are presented in terms of triadic power. These include relationships among interest groups and state autonomy, ‘high polities’ and routine politics, and types of coalitions in policy systems. Other propositions describe links to possible cycles between triadic power and plural elitism, to corporatist decision-making, and to the ‘resource mobilization’ theory of social movements.

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This article considers the four steps of interest group theory as it applies to American politics: group theory; Robert Dahl's pluralism; multiple elitist theory; and neopluralism. Participation in interest groups is seen to be one of four standard modes of participation in American politics. The interest group in niche theory is viewed in the context of other similar interest groups and its competition with them for resources of money and membership for group maintenance. It also pertains to group resource mobilization and group maintenance. The theory of internal democracy is also elaborated upon. Political scientists should keep remembering that attention must be paid to the role of interest groups in the theory and practice of democracy in America.