International joint venture: Buy-out and subsidiary

Sinha, Uday Bhanu

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2005.10.004

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…In some cases, the political environment policies of the MNE. In essence, as the political openness of a country increases, MNEs have an increasing capacity for mobilizing resources in that country, particularly the complementary assets which may be available only from the local environment (Lu/Xu 2006;Sinha 2008). Thus, with increasing openness, the likelihood of survival of these subsidiaries should increase or their mortality hazards should decrease.…”

Section: Political Openness and Fdi Mortalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional Environment and Subsidiary Survival

Dhanaraj

Beamish

2009

Manag Int Rev

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0We examine the effect of the institutional environment (IE) on the mortality of overseas subsidiaries. We develop hypotheses to study the impact of political openness and social -rates these relationships. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 12,000+ Japanese overseas investments from 1986-1997 in 25 countries, using Cox hazard models. 0 overseas subsidiaries. We theorized a negative main effect for political and social openness and positive interaction effects with openness when the FDI is through a JV. The results are

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Section: Political Openness and Fdi Mortalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional Environment and Subsidiary Survival

Dhanaraj

Beamish

2009

Manag Int Rev

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“…Will the information sharing be more or less than in a JV? As the literature is sparse on this topic, no absolute answer can be given to the above question, and various authors had investigated the instability of JVs (Banerjee & Mukherjee, 2010; De Hek & Mukherjee, 2011; Sinha, 2008). In the case of Italian biotech firms, Orsi and Belussi (2015) show a higher impact of downstream alliance than mergers and acquisitions on innovation.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The organizational choice of technology transfer mode: Theory and application to the genetically modified plant industry

2021

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The objective of the present paper is to identify the determinants of the form of collaboration initiated between an upstream innovator and a downstream producer in order to incorporate a new input and commercialize an innovation consisting of a quality enhanced final product, with an empirical application to the genetically modified (GM) plant industry. The choice of upstream firm between license, joint venture, merger, or a subsidiary is modeled as a function of three parameters: degree of quality improvement engendered by the new input, the market share of the downstream producer, and the capability of the downstream producer to incorporate the new input and commercialize it successfully.

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“…The literature studying the decisions by firms as to whether or not to engage in FDI when firms sign international joint ventures analyses factors that help to explain why such joint ventures are formed. Among other factors, it considers asymmetric information (Sinha, ), the transferring of knowledge (Lane et al ., ), access to new markets (Buckley & Casson, ) and the bargaining power of multinationals and host countries (Chen & Ma, ) . However, in the case of China, the restrictions on international joint ventures are also related to political reasons.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Restrictions on Foreign Investments and the Relocation of Firms

Dong

Bárcena‐Ruiz

Garzón

2015

Australian Economic Papers

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We analyse why the Chinese government sets restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus our analysis on the percentage of shares in relocated firms that the government allows to be foreign-owned. The government's decision on this percentage depends on the entry cost, the number of firms that relocate and the weight of the consumer surplus in the objective function of the government. We show that by its choice of this percentage, the Chinese government may restrict or encourage FDI to its country. We also find that if the government may subsidise the fixed entry cost, it provides a subsidy only when the producer surplus has a greater weight than the consumer surplus in weighted welfare. In that case, the subsidy encourages relocation by both firms and permits the government to allow a lower percentage of shares to be foreign-owned in relocated firms.

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International joint venture: Buy-out and subsidiary

Cited by 12 publications

References 53 publications

Institutional Environment and Subsidiary Survival

Institutional Environment and Subsidiary Survival

The organizational choice of technology transfer mode: Theory and application to the genetically modified plant industry

Restrictions on Foreign Investments and the Relocation of Firms

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