Interpretations and methods: Towards a more effectively self-correcting social psychology

Jussim, Lee; Crawford, Jarret T.; Anglin, Stephanie M.; Stevens, Sean T.; Duarte, José L.

doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2015.10.003

Cited by 73 publications

(86 citation statements)

References 96 publications

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“…What we actually find is that in several cases-such as perceptual/cognitive rigidity and dogmatism- they are quite a bit stronger than previous reviews suggested. The evidence also controverts the suggestion that ideological differences in epistemic motivation are confined to subjective, self-report measures (Jussim et al, 2016;Kahan, 2016;Van Hiel et al, 2010). On the contrary, there is now a good deal of evidence based on objective, behavioral measures of cognitive style-on tests of perceptual and cognitive rigidity as well as "cognitive reflection"-and the conclusions are virtually the same.…”

Section: Ideological Asymmetries In Epistemic Motivationmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Research in this area has also garnered some legitimate criticism on scientific grounds. Some of the more thoughtful questions and criticisms have come from members of ISPP, including the following: 1)What about rigidity of the left, especially in Central/Eastern Europe, given its history of dogmatic leadership and totalitarian socialism (Golec de Zavala, & Van Bergh, ; Greenberg & Jonas, )? 2)Are needs to reduce uncertainty and threat associated with authoritarianism—or ideological extremism in general—rather than political conservatism per se (Crowson, Thoma, & Hestevold, ; Greenberg & Jonas, ; van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten, & Eendebak, )? 3)Aren't the psychological correlates of social versus economic conservatism very different from one another (Crowson, ; Feldman & Johnston, ; Malka, Soto, Inzlicht, & Lelkes, )? 4)Could it be that the “true” effect sizes between psychological and political variables are much weaker than Jost et al () suggested (Jussim et al, ; Van Hiel et al, )? 5)Aren't ideological differences confined to subjective, self‐report measures that mean little when it comes to actual behavior (Kahan, ; Van Hiel et al, )? 6)Aren't liberals just as biased as conservatives when it comes to motivated social cognition (Conway et al, ; Crawford, ; Kahan, ), and just as prejudiced, too (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, ; Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, )? …”

Section: Political Ideology As Motivated Social Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The meta‐analysis by Jost, Sterling, et al () also provides plenty of evidence to dismiss Jussim et al's () claim that “true” effect sizes are much weaker than Jost et al () suggested. What we actually find is that in several cases—such as perceptual/cognitive rigidity and dogmatism—they are quite a bit stronger than previous reviews suggested.…”

Section: Ideological Asymmetries In Epistemic Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3) Aren't the psychological correlates of social versus economic conservatism very different from one another (Crowson, 2009;Feldman & Johnston, 2014;Malka, Soto, Inzlicht, & Lelkes, 2014)? 4) Could it be that the "true" effect sizes between psychological and political variables are much weaker than suggested (Jussim et al, 2016;Van Hiel et al, 2010)? 5) Aren't ideological differences confined to subjective, self-report measures that mean little when it comes to actual behavior (Kahan, 2016;Van Hiel et al, 2010)?…”

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confidence: 99%

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Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Jost

2017

Political Psychology

544

540

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Individuals are not merely passive vessels of whatever beliefs and opinions they have been exposed to; rather, they are attracted to belief systems that resonate with their own psychological needs and interests, including epistemic, existential, and relational needs to attain certainty, security, and social belongingness. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway () demonstrated that needs to manage uncertainty and threat were associated with core values of political conservatism, namely respect for tradition and acceptance of inequality. Since 2003 there have been far more studies on the psychology of left‐right ideology than in the preceding half century, and their empirical yield helps to address lingering questions and criticisms. We have identified 181 studies of epistemic motivation (involving 130,000 individual participants) and nearly 100 studies of existential motivation (involving 360,000 participants). These databases, which are much larger and more heterogeneous than those used in previous meta‐analyses, confirm that significant ideological asymmetries exist with respect to dogmatism, cognitive/perceptual rigidity, personal needs for order/structure/closure, integrative complexity, tolerance of ambiguity/uncertainty, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, self‐deception, and subjective perceptions of threat. Exposure to objectively threatening circumstances—such as terrorist attacks, governmental warnings, and shifts in racial demography—contribute to modest “conservative shifts” in public opinion. There are also ideological asymmetries in relational motivation, including the desire to share reality, perceptions of within‐group consensus, collective self‐efficacy, homogeneity of social networks, and the tendency to trust the government more when one's own political party is in power. Although some object to the very notion that there are meaningful psychological differences between leftists and rightists, the identification of “elective affinities” between cognitive‐motivational processes and contents of specific belief systems is essential to the study of political psychology. Political psychologists may contribute to the development of a good society not by downplaying ideological differences or advocating “Swiss‐style neutrality” when it comes to human values, but by investigating such phenomena critically, even—or perhaps especially—when there is pressure in society to view them uncritically.

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Section: Ideological Asymmetries In Epistemic Motivationmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Political Ideology As Motivated Social Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Ideological Asymmetries In Epistemic Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Jost

2017

Political Psychology

544

540

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“…One such culprit is confirmation bias, which refers to the tendency to seek and interpret evidence so as to support one's pre-existing intuitions (Nickerson, 1998; see also Chapter 15). Together, in much the same way as researchers' political beliefs can unintentionally bias their interpretation of evidence -a propensity dubbed questionable i nterpretive practice (Jussim, Crawford, Anglin, Stevens, & Duarte, 2016) -these factors tempt researchers away from reporting methods and results in their entirety, "warts" and all. Together, in much the same way as researchers' political beliefs can unintentionally bias their interpretation of evidence -a propensity dubbed questionable i nterpretive practice (Jussim, Crawford, Anglin, Stevens, & Duarte, 2016) -these factors tempt researchers away from reporting methods and results in their entirety, "warts" and all.…”

Section: Psychological Obstaclesmentioning

confidence: 99%