Investment and Adaptation as Commitment Devices in Climate Politics

Heuson, Clemens; Peters, Wolfgang; Schwarze, Reimund; Topp, Anna-Katharina

doi:10.1007/s10640-015-9887-z

Cited by 15 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…This specific form has been used in Breton & Sbragia (2017), Benchekroun et al (2017) and Masoudi & Zaccour (2016). 9 In this paper, we study the effects of including adaptive investments in the negotiation of an IEA aiming to reduce pollution emissions, when commitments to climate-change-adaptive measures are made before emission-mitigation decisions. This is modelled as a multi-stage game and solved by backward recursion.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Adaptation on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Breton

Sbragia

2019

Environ Resource Econ

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We examine the stability of international environmental agreements that include clauses pertaining to both adaptation and mitigation measures. We assume that adaptation requires a prior irreversible investment and presents the characteristics of a private good by reducing a country's vulnerability to the impact of pollution, while mitigation policies produce a public good by reducing the total amount of pollution. Using a stylized model, we show that adaptive measures can be used strategically and that their inclusion in environmental agreements enhances agreement stability and can even lead to full cooperation. We examine the robustness of agreements including both adaptation and mitigation measures against renegotiation. Finally, we evaluate how including adaptive measures for climate change in international environmental agreements affects welfare and overall pollution.

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Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Adaptation on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Breton

Sbragia

2019

Environ Resource Econ

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“…Yet, while global governance is viewed as the main point of intervention in the reviewed literature, Persson (2019) concludes that the insufficient recognition of adaptation as a global public good has so far resulted in limited legitimacy of global governance initiatives on adaptation. Another reason for the weak precision and obligation of global adaptation governance is found in “package deals” between mitigation and adaptation (Hall & Persson, 2018; Heuson et al, 2015).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adaptation to transboundary climate risks in trade: Investigating actors and strategies for an emerging challenge

Bednar–Friedl

Knittel

Raich

et al. 2022

WIREs Climate Change

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There is growing recognition that international trade can transmit climate risks across borders, requiring new forms of and approaches to adaptation. This advanced review synthesizes knowledge on how, by whom and where adaptation actions can be taken in the agriculture and industrial sectors to reduce these transboundary climate risks (TCRs). We find a material difference in the literature on TCRs in agriculture as compared with industrial sectors. Operational and market risks, in particular reductions in food availability, dominate in agriculture, while supply chain and trade‐related risks are highlighted for industry. While the origin of the risk (source) is the primary target of adaptation to agricultural TCRs, the general governance structure, such as UNFCCC and WTO deliberations, are important targets in both sectors. Adaptation at the country of destination and along the trade network is of minor importance in both sectors. Regarding the type of adaptation option, agriculture heavily relies on trade policy, agricultural adaptation, and adaptation planning and coordination, while in industry knowledge creation, research and development, and risk management are seen as essential. Governments and the international community are identified as key actors, complemented by businesses and research as critical players in industry. Some measures, such as protectionist trade policies and irrigation, are controversial as they shift risks across countries and sectors, rather than reduce them. While more research is needed, this review shows that a critical mass of evidence on adaptation to TCRs is beginning to emerge, particularly underscoring the importance of international coordination mechanisms. This article is categorized under: Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change > Institutions for Adaptation Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

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“…This case is analogous to the sequencing of fixing mitigation before adaptation since in each case strategic incentives do not arise (see, e.g. Zehaie, 2009;Heuson et al, 2015a). The latter sequencing is usually seen as the natural order since mitigation combats the cause of climate change and adaptation alleviates the consequences of climate change that had not been avoided by mitigation.…”

Section: Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For a more detailed analysis of the comparison of the Nash equilibrium with the e cient solution seeHeuson et al (2015a) …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Pareto Improvements Induced by Climate Funding in a Strategic Adaptation-Mitigation Framework

Peters¹,

Schwarze²,

Topp³

2017

Climate Finance

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We address the international regime of climate finance, which is emerging in the post-Kyoto architecture, and investigate which type of earmarked funding may lead to Pareto improvements for donor and recipient countries. As funding within the post-Kyoto framework is voluntary, sustained finance in the long term can only be guaranteed if all participating countries benefit. In order to rule out for the Bergstrom paradox, which states that recipient countries may end up in a worse-o↵ situation as a consequence of conditional transfers, we presume a framework in which donor countries commit themselves not to reduce their own mitigation e↵orts. Regarding three types of earmarked climate funding, which compensate either mitigation, adaptation or damage costs, we find that only funds that are directed at mitigation activities boost the global level of mitigation and may induce Pareto improvements. Transferring our results into the political context of the Green Climate Fund, we recommend to prioritize finance of "energy generation and access", which aims at enhancing mitigation through low-emission power generation and access.

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Investment and Adaptation as Commitment Devices in Climate Politics

Cited by 15 publications

References 19 publications

The Impact of Adaptation on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

The Impact of Adaptation on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Adaptation to transboundary climate risks in trade: Investigating actors and strategies for an emerging challenge

Pareto Improvements Induced by Climate Funding in a Strategic Adaptation-Mitigation Framework

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