Is Nigeria really fighting to win the anti-corruption war?

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the seeming paradox that underpins Nigeria’s war on corruption. This paradox centres on the undue interference of the presidency in the war against corruption. This interference has resulted in selective prosecutions and a deceleration in the tempo of the anti-corruption crusade. Design/methodology/approach The study used an admixture of primary and secondary data to evaluate whether indeed Nigeria is fighting against corruption to win it. The primary data were derived from key informant interviews. A total of ten diverse experts were interviewed through the instrumentality of unstructured set of questions, which were administered to them with room for elaboration. The secondary data were sourced from archival materials. Findings The findings of the study centre on three key issues: a characteristic one-sidedness in the prosecution of alleged corruption offenders by the anti-graft agencies. Those with pending corruption cases who have decamped to the ruling All Progressives Congress have had their cases placed in abeyance. There is evidence of the politicisation of the war against corruption as well as evidence of weak institutionalisation, which robs the anti-corruption agencies of the capacity to act independently. Practical implications The anti-corruption war may likely be derailed if the operational efficiency of the anti-graft agencies is not enhanced and their independence guaranteed. Social implications If the anti-corruption crusade fails, it will have multiple negative domino effects on national development and quality of life of the Nigerian people. Originality/value The paper is original because no recent study has interrogated the declining efficiency of Nigeria’s anti-graft agencies or linked this declining efficiency on weak institutionalisation and interference from the presidency.

El nuevo orden social bajo decreto de emergencia: riesgos para la gestión pública y la vida democrática

“…Se práticas públicas de acionamento de dispositivos de emergência são uma forma legalmente embasada para viabilizar medidas institucionais excepcionais em resposta a uma situação crítica em ocorrência, o aumento da frequência e o espraiamento dessas práticas indicam a normalização de uma cultura de proteção falha e acende um sinal de alerta à democracia. O ambiente sociopolítico permissivo a isso tornar-se-ia potencialmente exposto à apropriação indébita de recursos públicos, para não dizer um palco onde governantes com disposições antidemocráticas exercitariam suas pretensões políticas autocráticas no uso instrumental do continuado sofrimento alheio (BOL et al, 2020;FACCHINI;MELKI, 2019;NILSEN;SKARPENES, 2020;NWOZOR et al, 2020).…”

Has anything changed with illegitimate electoral financing and political power contestation in Nigeria?

“…At the global level, Article 7(3) of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) placed a demand on all countries to strive towards evolving appropriate legislative and administrative measures to enhance transparency in the funding of candidates and political parties (Santucci & Öhman, 2009). The whole essence of evolving benchmarks to drive political financing is to strengthen democratic practices by limiting monetary and non-monetary contributions to political parties; reducing the possibilities of corruption in the political processes and improving transparency in the political system generally (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2010;Nwozor, Olanrewaju, Oshewolo et al, 2020;Ohman, 2014).…”

“…Beyond the logic of smoothing electoral unevenness likely to be caused by access to excess funds, the limitation placed on electoral funding is designed to achieve a combination of goals. These goals would include managing the cost of party politics, bridging inequalities between contestants and political parties, reducing the prospects of vote-buying, insulating the electoral processes, and by extension the political system, from plutocratic ambush and limiting the scope of improper influence and corruption on the political system (Walecki, 2009;Brunelle-Quraishi, 2010;Power, 2020;Nwozor Olanrewaju, Oshewolo et al, 2020).…”

Keeping up appearance? Nigeria’s anti-corruption crusade and image dilemma in the global arena

“…Nigeria is classified among the most corrupt countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, going by anecdotal evidence, credible empirical studies and other global indices (Akanle and Adesina, 2015; Bamidele et al , 2016; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017; Igiebor, 2019). Corruption is deep-rooted in Nigeria and has been so since its political independence in 1960 (Dumbili and Sofadekan, 2016; Nwozor et al , 2020). The paradoxical nature of corruption in Nigeria is that the more the political elites promised to confront and defeat it, the more self-sustaining and intractable it became, including the capacity to fight back for survival (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011).…”

“…The paradoxical nature of corruption in Nigeria is that the more the political elites promised to confront and defeat it, the more self-sustaining and intractable it became, including the capacity to fight back for survival (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011). There is an undeniable awareness among Nigerians about the negative impacts of corruption on national development and the desire to root it out in the country’s body politic (Igiebor, 2019; Nwozor et al , 2020). The political elite, both of the civilian and military genres, understood this desire and fully exploited it.…”