Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning?

Fassio, Davide

doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0792-2

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…For recent examples see Littlejohn (2020, §1) and Moss (2018a, p. 197), who claims that such cases are "suggestive but not decisive", since they are susceptible to alternative equally intuitive explanations (cfr. Brown, 2008, Cresto 2010, Fassio 2017, Gerken 2011, Neta 2009, Schiffer 2007. 37 The present example is a variant of one discussed in Hawthorne and Stanley (2008, p. 572).…”

Section: Lotteriesmentioning

confidence: 87%

Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?

Fassio

Gao

2021

Synthese

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The paper investigates what type of motivation can be given for adopting a knowledge-based decision theory (hereafter, KBDT). KBDT seems to have several advantages over competing theories of rationality. It is commonly argued that this theory would naturally fit with the intuitive idea that being rational is doing what we take to be best given what we know, an idea often supported by appeal to ordinary folk appraisals. Moreover, KBDT seems to strike a perfect balance between the problematic extremes of subjectivist and objectivist decision theory. We argue that these alleged advantages do not stand up to a closer scrutiny: KBDT inherits the same kinds of problems as alternative decision theoretic frameworks but doesn't retain any of the respective advantages. Moreover, differently from other knowledge-action principles advanced in the literature, KBDT cannot fully explain the intuitive connections between knowledge and rational action. We conclude that the most serious challenge for knowledge-based decision theorists is to provide a substantive rationale for the adoption of such a view.

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Section: Lotteriesmentioning

confidence: 87%

Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?

Fassio

Gao

2021

Synthese

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“…31 Couldn't its prudential function alone explain why one is permitted to use p as a premise in practical reasoning if and only if one knows p? For instance, couldn't it be the case that reasoning and forming intentions only on the basis of knowledge would guarantee better practical results in the long run and safer achievements (Fassio, 2017)?…”

Section: Practical Vs Theoretical Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge and reasoning

Simion

2021

Synthese

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This paper develops a novel, functionalist, unified account of the epistemic normativity of reasoning. On this view, epistemic norms drop out of epistemic functions. I argue that practical reasoning serves a prudential function of generating prudentially permissible action, and the epistemic function of generating knowledge of what one ought to do. This picture, if right, goes a long way towards normatively divorcing action and practical reasoning. At the same time, it unifies reasoning epistemically: practical and theoretical reasoning will turn out to be governed by the same epistemic norm—knowledge—in virtue of serving the same epistemic function: generating knowledge of the conclusion.

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“…See also Schulz (2018). For a discussion of the distinction between epistemic norms and epistemic standards, see Fassio (2017). DeRose (2009, p. 90) considers explaining the bank cases in this way and calls this approach the "Generality Objection" to contextualism (see also Pritchard, 2010).…”

Section: Refined Invariantismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See also Schulz (). For a discussion of the distinction between epistemic norms and epistemic standards, see Fassio ().…”

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confidence: 99%

Refined Invariantism

Vollet

2020

Theoria

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A certain number of cases suggest that our willingness to ascribe “knowledge” can be influenced by practical factors. For revisionary proposals, they indicate that the truth‐values of “knowledge” ascriptions vary with practical factors. For conservative proposals, on the contrary, nothing surprising is happening. Standard pragmatic approaches appeal to pragmatic implicatures and psychological approaches to the idea that belief formation is influenced by practical factors. Conservative proposals have not yet offered a fully satisfactory explanation, though. In this article, I introduce and defend a third conservative proposal which I call “Refined Invariantism”. The two main claims of this proposal are that (1) we should distinguish between high stakes cases in which the subject does not believe (that he knows) the target proposition and those in which he believes (that he knows) the target proposition and that (2) we should adopt a psychological treatment for the first kind of case and a pragmatic treatment based on the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion and action for the second kind of case. I argue that this new combined approach avoids the main pitfalls of its two conservative rivals and that it gives new life to the generality objection levelled against revisionary views.

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Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning?

Cited by 10 publications

References 59 publications

Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?

Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?

Knowledge and reasoning

Refined Invariantism

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