Japan since 1980

Cargill, Thomas F.; Sakamoto, Takayuki

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511754333

Cited by 18 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…When the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) lost its place as Japan's ruling party in 1994 after 39 years of uninterrupted rule, competition began among the new coalition parties to cater to such requests from the business community. Although the LDP shortly returned to power, from this point, neoliberal reforms of national systems marked the basic tone of Japan's policies (Cargill and Sakamoto 2008).…”

Section: The Advance Of Globalization and The End Of Developmentalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individualizing Japan: searching for its origin in first modernity

Suzuki

Ito

Ishida

et al. 2010

British Journal of Sociology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Since the mid-1990s Japanese society has entered a period of major change. The previous patterns of social order and social integration have collapsed, and it has become increasingly difficult to envision a stable life course for oneself. The 'secure' foundation has been weakening and anxiety has spread at an accelerated pace. Japan could enter the age of second modernity, or reflexive modernization. In Japan's first modernity, the mechanism responsible for risk management, an integrated society, and stabilized social order, was, first, private corporations that guaranteed long-term stability for employees and their families (company-centrism) and, second, land development rapidly implemented under the guidance of bureaucrats (developmentalism). From the 1990s, these systems were fundamentally destroyed by globalization and neoliberal policies. Private corporations limited the groups that could benefit from the seniority wage system, undermining in-house welfare benefits. The government abandoned its role of improving the industrial and economic conditions of surrounding areas through offering public works projects. After these risk-stabilizing mechanisms were gone, two problems became conspicuous - poverty among young workers in urban areas and the collapse of the local community in marginal areas. As the seniority wage system and lifetime employment were substitutes for the public social security system, public measures to deal with poverty remain inadequate. Now, the individualization of the family has advanced somewhat under compulsion as the rate of unmarried people and the divorce rate have climbed. The Japanese have a tendency to seek 'self-realization'; at the same time, they also want 'secure employment'. Thus, they are torn between individualization and the desire for security. What is now necessary is a more stable system that will ensure them adequate material and spiritual 'elbowroom' to allow them to make their own choices.

show abstract

Section: The Advance Of Globalization and The End Of Developmentalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individualizing Japan: searching for its origin in first modernity

Suzuki

Ito

Ishida

et al. 2010

British Journal of Sociology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Two elements matter for our purpose: on the one hand, the fact that it was highly decentralized, more than in the US in a sense, as many of the rules governing it (such as employment and financial relations) were defined at the micro level; on the other hand, the necessity, because of this high degree of decentralization, to have specific forms of coordination, both private, such as keiretsu, and public such as IP (Lechevalier, 2014). These private and public forms of coordination were themselves coordinated as indicated by the expression "iron triangle" that describes the interrelations between the politicians (especially from the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP], which was in power continuously from the mid-1950s to the early 1990s), the bureaucracy and the industries (Cargill & Sakamoto, 2008).…”

Section: The Golden Age Of Ip In Japan: Financial Containment and Mobilization Decentralization And Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Financialization and Industrial Policies in Japan and Korea Evolving Complementarities and Loss of Institutional Capabilities

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The purpose of this article is to analyze the revival of industrial policies from the late 2000s in Japan and Korea and their limitations. Our approach has two major characteristics. First, we adopt the perspective of historical institutionalism to focus on the relation between IPs and financial systems and study their evolution over the last 40 years. Second, by mobilizing the concepts of institutional complementarities and hierarchy, we discuss the limits of this revival in a context of liberalized financial systems, to which IPs have contributed. Our major result is that, in the context of financialization, past complementarities of the developmental state have weakened and contradictions have arisen. It resulted in a restructuration of state capabilities to design and implement IPs, and to its inability to subordinate finance to its goals, despite the discourses and ambitions of governments. However, and this is our second result, comparison between Japan and Korea also allows us to identify some significant differences that may explain diverging trends in terms of the deindustrialization and internationalization of these two economies.

show abstract

“…What must be underscored is that, by the early 2010s, there was not yet a clear consensus as to the causes of Japanese stagnation since the early 1990s. While some explanations emphasize short-term reasons -policy mistakes, for example, particularly in the area of monetary policy (see, for example, Bernanke, 2000;Krugman, 1998;Koo, 2003;or Ito and Mishkin, 2004) -others focus on structural factors such as the end of catch-up areas, an aging population and the lingering effects of the financial crisis provoked by the "bubble" (see, for example, Motonishi and Yoshikawa, 1999;Yoshikawa, 2002;Hoshi and Kashyap, 2011;or Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008). As Wakatabe (2015) has argued, the second category of explanations has achieved dominance over the past fifteen years.…”

Section: Abenomics and Debate Over The Lost Decade(s)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Abenomics: Has it Worked? Will it Fail?

Lechevalier

Monfort

2016

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abenomics initially generated high expectations but it has more recently come to be seen as yet another failed economic experiment. Yet discussion of Abenomics often verges on caricature. It is thus crucial to provide a critical and balanced evaluation. We argue that, over the past four years, the proactive policies pursued under Abenomics have played a decisive role in reversing one cause of the Japanese slowdown -inconsistent economic policies -and that they are now yielding preliminary results. We are more critical in regards to long-term issues: as the case of trade policy shows, the problem is not so much a lack of structural reform as limits to its ability to increase Japan's growth potential.

show abstract

Japan since 1980

Cited by 18 publications

References 0 publications

Individualizing Japan: searching for its origin in first modernity

Individualizing Japan: searching for its origin in first modernity

Financialization and Industrial Policies in Japan and Korea Evolving Complementarities and Loss of Institutional Capabilities

Abenomics: Has it Worked? Will it Fail?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About