Konvergenz der nationalen Corporate Governance-Systeme? — Ursachen und Internationalisierungswirkungen der Denationalisierung der Corporate Governance großer deutscher Aktiengesellschaften am Beispiel der Hoechst AG

Negotiated Shareholder Value: The German Version of an Anglo-American Practice

“…A third development was Vodafone's takeover of Mannesmann, the first major hostile takeover in Germany (Höpner and Jackson 2003). A fourth development was that a number of large companies announced that they were adopting "shareholder value" as a key strategic goal; some of these companies made an explicit link between this step and the previous developments, such as the chemical/pharmaceutical company Hoechst (Eckert 2000).…”

“…These types of investors, who are particularly strong advocates of shareholder value, have accounted for a steadily increasing proportion of share ownership in the recent past. Given the stark choices offered by the shareholder versus stakeholder dichotomy, one position in the debate is that these institutional investors are powerful enough to force stakeholder systems to convergence on the shareholder model (Eckert 2000;Itami 1999). A second position is that these investors do not exercise enough influence to change the fundamental features of stakeholder systems, i.e.…”

Shareholder Value, Management Culture and Production Regimes in the Transformation of the German Chemical-Pharmaceutical Industry

“…In this case, an increased emphasis on profits and the adoption of a pure life sciences strategy, which involved drastic organizational changes provoking the resistance 8 For detailed accounts of changes at Hoechst see Berthoin Antal (2001 a and b), Menz et al (1999), and Eckert (2000). 8 Hoechst provides an illustration of the ''relative autonomy'' of top management from shareholders and stakeholders.…”

“…Though some have argued that the threat of a hostile takeover essentially forced Hoechst to follow a shareholder value life-sciences oriented strategy (Eckert, 2000), in fact the 25% equity stake held by the state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corporation meant that a hostile takeover was even less likely at Hoechst than at the other two companies. Though some have argued that the threat of a hostile takeover essentially forced Hoechst to follow a shareholder value life-sciences oriented strategy (Eckert, 2000), in fact the 25% equity stake held by the state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corporation meant that a hostile takeover was even less likely at Hoechst than at the other two companies.…”

“…The Hoechst case seems to clearly disprove at least the simple version of convergence variants of corporate governance theory. Though some have argued that the threat of a hostile takeover essentially forced Hoechst to follow a shareholder value life-sciences oriented strategy (Eckert, 2000), in fact the 25% equity stake held by the state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corporation meant that a hostile takeover was even less likely at Hoechst than at the other two companies. 11 Nevertheless, the new top management was convinced that shareholder value was needed to legitimate the changes needed for Hoechst to survive and therefore pushed through radical changes despite considerable opposition from stakeholders.…”