Language, Thought and Reference

Abstract

How should we best analyse the meaning of proper names, indexicals, demonstratives, both simple and complex, and definite descriptions? In what relation do such expressions stand to the objects they designate? In what relation do they stand to mental representations of those objects? Do these expressions form a semantic class, or must we distinguish between those that arc referential and those that are quantificational? Such questions have constituted one of the core research areas in the philosophy of language for much of the last century, yet consensus remains elusive: the field is still divided, for instance, between those who hold that all such expressions are semantically descriptive and those who would analyse most as the natural language counterparts of logical individual constants.The aim of this thesis is to cast new light on such questions by approaching them from within the cognitive framework of Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory.Relevance Theory offers not just an articulated pragmatics but also a broad conception of the functioning of natural language which differs radically from that presupposed within (most of) the philosophy of language. The function of linguistic expressions, on this conception, is not to determine propositional content, but rather to provide inferential premises which, in parallel with context and general pragmatic principles, will enable a bearer to reach the speaker's intended interpretation.Working within this framework, I shall argue that the semantics of the expressions discussed should best be analysed not in terms of their relation to those objects which, on occasions of use, they may designate, but rather in terms of the indications they offer a hearer concerning the mental representation which constitutes the content of a speaker's informative intention. Such an analysis can, I shall claim, capture certain key data on reference which have proved notoriously problematic, while respecting a broad range of apparently conflicting intuitions.

Pragmatically motivated null subjects in English: A relevance theory perspective

“…6 Further discussion along similar lines can be found in Hussein (2008), Kaplan (1989), Powell (2010, Scott (2010), Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Zaki (2009).…”

Language, Sex and Social Structure

“…andPowell 2010). It is impossible to identify how the concept JO might operate within logical operators: we cannot say, for instance, that the proposition X is Jo entails the proposition X is a hockey player because there would be no logical contradiction in making the claim that Jo is not a hockey player.…”

“…To address this question requires an understanding of a number of relevance-theoretic accounts of concepts (including Sperber and Wilson 1995, Carston 2002and Powell 2010, which I will explain in detail in Chapter 4. To address this question requires an understanding of a number of relevance-theoretic accounts of concepts (including Sperber and Wilson 1995, Carston 2002and Powell 2010, which I will explain in detail in Chapter 4.…”

“…George Powell's (2010) relevance-theory-based monograph on 'individual concepts' offers, to my mind, some promising possibilities. George Powell's (2010) relevance-theory-based monograph on 'individual concepts' offers, to my mind, some promising possibilities.…”

Token-reflexive, anaphoric and deictic functions of ‘here’

“…The jointly token-reflexive and anaphoric use of here in B's utterance in (3 ) also deviates from an anaphoric here which is not concomitantly token-reflexive, in that speaker B does not have to worry about what we are going to refer to as the speaker-activation condition on appropriate use of here, a discourse constraint that will be introduced in Section 2.2. Following Powell's (2010) terminology, we will say that it is B's derivational intention in producing (3 ) that A undertakes a dual pragmatic processing of B's indexical and associates this token with the properties pertaining to spatial anaphora as well as the properties pertaining to spatial reflexives. We assume that speaker B in (3 ) intends the hearer A to handle the word here pragmatically both as a token-reflexive and as an anaphoric indexical, because this will lead A to successful resolution of its reference.…”