Leadership in the WTO: Brazil, India and the Doha development agenda

Reformist Multipolarity and Global Trade Governance in an Era of Systemic Power Redistribution

“…In many cases, emerging powers defended interests that were not their own, but were vital for other developing countries. Because of the need to control their alliances, Brazil and India could not provide many concessions in the G-4 (Efstathopoulos, 2012). Therefore, disagreement within the G-4 did not signify a lack of commitment over the WTO's stability, but rather reflected the belief of emerging powers that achieving such stability required alleviating the frustration of weaker members.…”

“…The 2005 Hong Kong ministerial witnessed the emergence of the G-4 (US, EU, Brazil, India), a new group encompassing both established and emerging powers that was more effective and legitimate in driving the negotiating process (Wilkinson, 2006). Also described as the "New Quad," the G-4 replaced the traditional Quad (US, EU, Japan, Canada) that had successfully provided leadership in the GATT and depicted the emergence of a North-South multipolar system of governance in the WTO (Efstathopoulos, 2012). The G-4 states were not bound by the collective understandings that had underpinned the Western-centric Quad, but nevertheless shared a common interest in achieving progress in the DDA.…”

“…These states strived to agree on the balance of commitments over critical areas, such as agriculture, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), and the special and differential treatment (Efstathopoulos, 2012). The ministerial meeting that took place in Geneva in July 2008 was a particularly critical moment as all major players were close to reaching agreement, but the meeting collapsed due to disagreement over flexibilities on food security (Wolfe, 2010).…”

New Powers and the Distribution of Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation

“…Over the course of the Uruguay Round, and in particular in the preparatory and negotiation stages of the WTO's DDA, the governments of new powers have also become central protagonists in the politics of the WTO in its rulemaking, rule-monitoring and rule-implementation stages (Narlikar 2010, Zeng 2013, Júnior et al 2015, Hopewell 2016, Karlas and Parízek 2017. This has included a renewed attempt to forge developing country coalitions to boost bargaining power in negotiations (Cho 2004, Narlikar and Tussie 2004, Narlikar and Wilkinson 2004, Taylor 2006, Efstathopoulos 2012, Doctor 2015. While China is by far the largest new power economically, already since the 2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference, it has been Brazil and India, partly with the support of South Africa, that have led the effective opposition to the established powers in the WTO (Hopewell 2015, p. 324).…”

India and the BRICS: Global Bandwagoning and Regional Balancing

“…As a traditional critic of the dominance of Western countries in the multilateral trade regime, India has deftly exploited coalitions with other developing countries to receive integration in 'green room' negotiations of the major trade powers [Efstathopoulos 2012]. While characterized by strong dissimilarities in their trading profiles, India and the other BRICS states shared an aversion to the 'deep integration' agenda fostered by established powers [Stephen, Parizek 2015].…”