Les concubins et l’impôt sur le revenu en France

Abstract

[fre] La législation fiscale française ne permet pas aux couples de concubins de déclarer ensemble leurs revenus à l'impôt sur le revenu. Ils perdent ainsi, par rapport aux couples mariés, le bénéfice du quotient conjugal, dispositif susceptible de réduire l'impôt supporté par un couple. L'examen de la législation montre que le quotient conjugal joue pleinement lorsque la structure des apports de ressources dans le couple est fortement dissymétrique. Il permet de repérer les dispositifs qui amoindrissent les effets du quotient conjugal : le mécanisme de la décote et celui du minimum de recouvrement. Le mariage peut alors se traduire par des pertes financières. Dans certains cas, le fait pour le moins favorisé des deux conjoints de ne plus pouvoir bénéficier de la prime pour l'emploi en cas de mariage peut également se traduire par une perte. Pour conclure à l'impact effectif du mariage en terme de perte ou de gain, il importe d'apprécier la fréquence réelle des configurations des couples correspondantes, et de simuler le mariage des couples de concubins : un modèle de microsimulation ' Myriade ' à partir de la situation réelle des couples en 2005 montre que le concubinage, s'il est largement répandu, reste plus particulièrement prégnant chez les personnes les plus modestes. La simulation du mariage des concubins conduit à un gain au mariage modeste : la dissymétrie des apports et le niveau de vie, plus faibles chez les concubins, contribuent largement à l'expliquer. [eng] Unmarried couples and income taxes in France. French tax laws do not allow unmarried couples to declare their income jointly. Thus they lose out, when compared to married couples, on the married couples’ tax relief, a system which can decrease a couple’s tax liability. A close look at the laws shows that the married couples’ tax relief has the fullest effect when the structure of the spouses’ contribution to the total is signifi cantly asymmetric. It pinpoints the provisions that reduce the effectiveness of the married couple’s tax allowance: the graduated relief and the minimum payment threshold. Marriage can then result in fi nancial loss. In some cases, the fact that the less well-off of the two partners no longer qualifi es for the employment bonus when married can also cause a loss. To reach a conclusion on the effects of marriage in terms of loss or profi t, it is important to understand the actual frequency of occurrence of the corresponding confi gurations of couples and to simulate marriage for unmarried couples: Myriade, a microsimulation model based on the real situation of couples in 2005, shows that non-marital union, even if it is widespread, offers the most possibilities for people in the lowest income brackets. Simulating the marriage of unmarried couples shows a small advantage to marriage: this is mostly explained by the asymmetry in resources and a lower standard of living, both lower in unmarried couples. [ger] Unverheiratete Lebenspartner und Einkommensteuer in Frankreich. Das französische Steuergesetz gestattet es zwei unve...

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