Abstract. The replicator-mutator equations from evolutionary dynamics serve as a model for the evolution of language, behavioral dynamics in social networks, and decision-making dynamics in networked multi-agent systems. Analysis of the stable equilibria of these dynamics has been a focus in the literature, where symmetry in fitness functions is typically assumed. We explore asymmetry in fitness and show that the replicator-mutator equations exhibit Hopf bifurcations and limit cycles. We prove conditions for the existence of stable limit cycles arising from multiple distinct Hopf bifurcations of the dynamics in the case of circulant fitness matrices. In the noncirculant case we illustrate how stable limit cycles of the dynamics are coupled to embedded directed cycles in the payoff graph. These cycles correspond to oscillations of grammar dominance in language evolution and to oscillations in behavioral preferences in social networks; for decision-making systems, these limit cycles correspond to sustained oscillations in decisions across the group.Key words. replicator-mutator dynamics, limit cycle bifurcations, social networks AMS subject classifications. 91A22, 37G15, 91D301. Introduction. Evolutionary dynamics [32,19,7,31] are, broadly speaking, an effort to cast the basic tenets of Darwinian natural selection (replication, competition, strategy dependent fitness, mutation) in a mathematical framework that can be simulated, interpreted, and often rigorously analyzed. John Maynard Smith's pioneering work [25] made formal connections between classical game theory and evolutionary dynamics. Particularly important was Maynard Smith's definition of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS's), which are equilibria of an evolutionary dynamical system that are uninvadable by other competing strategies in the environment, and hence stable in an evolutionary sense. From a game theoretic perspective, ESS's are a subset of the Nash equilibria of a game: they satisfy both the Nash best reply condition and evolutionary uninvadability.The replicator dynamics [27] are the simplest model of evolutionary dynamics for a large population comprised of N sub-populations, each subscribed to a different competing strategy. These differential equations model the game theoretic interactions among the sub-populations and determine how each sub-population changes in size as a consequence of these interactions. Lyapunov stable equilibria of the replicator dynamics are Nash equilibria of the corresponding game [34]. Further, all ESS's of the replicator dynamics are asymptotically stable [34].Although the replicator dynamics have proved to be a powerful tool in analyzing a variety of classical games from an evolutionary perspective, they do not model mutation, a key ingredient of selection theory. Mutation can be included by adding the possibility that individuals spontaneously change from one strategy to another. This yields the replicator-mutator dynamics [2,21], which have played a prominent role in evolutionary theory and contain as limiti...