M. A. Polievktov and the First Oral Histories of the February Revolution

President Clinton's Intervention Into Bosnia, 1995

“…The day after Clinton approved the plan, he sent Lake to Britain and France to sell the idea. Contrary to the approach of Warren Christopher's failed attempt with the Europeans in 1993, Lake (2002) explained that the United States was going to launch this campaign “unilaterally if you don't agree to come along.” This different approach from the United States, along with Clinton's arming and enabling of the Croatian offensive operations, helped the Europeans to decide (Holbrooke 1998; Lake 2002). They finally agreed to join.…”

“…The Bosnian Serb attacks on marketplaces within the safe areas created an opening for the United States to initiate “pinprick” airstrikes in response. The Clinton administration did not receive wide sweeping authorization to conduct airstrikes as was initially requested, but the partial acceptance was welcome in comparison to the blanket denial (Lake 2002). On April 10, 1994, U.S. aircraft dropped the first “pinprick” bomb on Serb targets, compelling Serbian forces to withdraw heavy weaponry and pull back from offensive positions (Clinton 1994q).…”

“…After contemplating the diplomatic fallout of an overt approval of this transfer of arms, the Clinton administration simply gave “no instructions” for the operation (Henriksen 1996, 17). Anthony Lake (2002) deftly explained, “we never explicitly agreed to the Croatians sending arms in to the Bosnians,” but the Croatians understood the message. The United States tacitly approved the transfer of arms, but it would not give official assent (Fierke 1996).…”

“…Some observers placed the responsibility for “no instructions” at the feet of Anthony Lake (Ripley 1999; Halberstam 2001). However, many years after the fact, Lake (2002) denied that he knew the arms were coming from Iran.…”