Machines, Sentience, and the Scope of Morality

The Moral Status of Non-human Beings and Their Ecosystems

“…Species as such do not 'have' rationality or feelings, of course: only their members have such characteristics. However, when we af rm that a given species shows rationality or an ability to feel pain or pleasure, it is because such characteristics are common to most of its members (Singer, 1975;Williams, 1980;Norton, 1982Norton, , 1984Kaufman, 1994;Agar, 1995).…”

A Framework for Grounding the Moral Status of Intelligent Machines

“…; if a thing has a "state with qualia", it has phenomenal consciousness [12]. Phenomenal consciousness sometimes is discussed along with other properties such as sentience [17], desires and preferences [11], intentionality [21], etc. Regarding the threshold for classifying an intelligent machine into region SF (Figure 1), I propose that the entity must have just enough phenomenal consciousness to experience pleasure and pain.…”

“…One could say that a conscious person and my oak tree both have interests. In Kaufman's [11] view, "morality is centrally, if not essentially, concerned with assessing benefits or harms resulting from the actions of moral agents." According to Kaufman, because benefits or harms only matter to entities with interests, it is just such entities that are candidates for moral status.…”

“…According to Kaufman, because benefits or harms only matter to entities with interests, it is just such entities that are candidates for moral status. Kaufman [11] claims that there are "two distinct senses of what it means to have an interest": (1) desires and ( 2) "a good or a well-being." Desires (actual, potential, or idealized) require what Kaufman refers to as "mentality."…”

Ecocentrism, Weighted Interests and Property Theory

“…The problem is laid out in considerable detail in Kaufman [1994]. Variations of this challenge have been rejected on several grounds; see especially Attfleld (1981], Bernstein [1992] and Vamer [1998: Ch.…”