Majority voting with single-crossing preferences

Gans, Joshua S.; Smart, Michael

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(95)01503-5

Cited by 296 publications

(230 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

226

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…But the admissible tax functions are also quadratic in income. Gans and Smart (1996) show that the majority preference relation over 1 convex tax schedules satisfying a 'single-crossing' property is quasi-transitive.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Income taxation, uncertainty and stability

Marhuenda

Ortuño‐Ortín

1998

Journal of Public Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper develops a political model to analyze the stability of income tax schedules. It is assumed that agents perceive any proposed alternative tax policy as more uncertain than the status quo. A tax policy is stable if it is a Condorcet winner. It is well known that in a model without uncertainty the existence of such a policy is very rare. We show, however, that in real cases this might not be a serious problem since small amounts of uncertainty can bring stability to the status quo. It is also shown that linear tax functions can only be stable in economies with very egalitarian income distributions and high taxation levels. © 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Cukierman and Meltzer (1991), Snyder and Kramer (1988), Roemer (1994), and Gans and Smart (1996) different tax functions are considered but some new, also quite restrictive, assumptions are needed. In Snyder and Kramer (1988) only tax functions which are individually optimal for some voter are allowed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Income taxation, uncertainty and stability

Marhuenda

Ortuño‐Ortín

1998

Journal of Public Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For a use of the single-crossing property in the standard Downsian model, see Gans and Smart (1996). Proof of Theorem 1.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition between Specialized Candidates

Krasa

Polborn

2010

Am Polit Sci Rev

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We develop a formal model in which the government provides public goods in different policy fields for its citizens. We start from the basic premise that two office-motivated candidates have differential capabilities in different policy fields, and compete by proposing how to allocate government resources to those fields. The model has a unique equilibrium that differs substantially from the standard median-voter model. While candidates compete for the support of a moderate voter type, this cutoff voter differs from the expected median voter. Moreover, no voter type except the cutoff voter is indifferent between the candidates in equilibrium. The model also predicts that candidates respond to changes in the preferences of voters in a very rigid way. We also analyze under which conditions candidates choose to strengthen the issue in which they have a competence advantage, and when they rather compensate for their weakness. JEL-Code: D72.

show abstract

“…On the contrary, the simple structure of our model leads to a utility function that is supermodular (or submodular) with respect to the relevant parameters. This feature allows us to use the results for voting games discussed in Gans and Smart (1996) which makes our analysis more parsimonious. As a result, our model is well-suited to perform comparative statics, for example, with respect to changes in the distribution of warm-glow in the population, addressing questions such as if more altruistic societies are likely to have also a larger stock of a public good.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voluntary contributions “vote out” public ones

Calveras

Ganuza

Llobet

2011

SERIEs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many public goods are supported with both private and public funding. It is often argued that public funding, based on taxes, crowds out private philanthropic contributions. Agents respond to increases in taxes by decreasing their donations. The tax level, however, is not exogenous and it depends on the political equilibrium arising from agents' voting decisions. In this paper we analyze a variety of motivations for voluntary donations and show that when philanthropic preferences become more prevalent in the society, the equilibrium tax level will tend to be lower and, more surprisingly, the stock of the public good may decrease.We thank the referees for their comments. We also thank Ignacio

show abstract

Majority voting with single-crossing preferences

Cited by 296 publications

References 11 publications

Income taxation, uncertainty and stability

Income taxation, uncertainty and stability

Competition between Specialized Candidates

Voluntary contributions “vote out” public ones

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About