Marland, Alex, Brand Command: Canadian Politics and Democracy in the Age of Message Control.

Abstract

S tephen Harper's government was known above all for one thingmessage control. Brand Command, written by Memorial University political communications expert, Alex Marland, helps make sense of this message control and explores the implications of such control for democracy in Canada. It is a well-researched and well-written book, but it is not a comforting read. Marland takes a provocative and highly relevant position visà-vis Canadian politics, power, and communications-i.e., that as interactive, web2.0 media expand democracy itself shrinks. Indeed the dominant metaphor for the Canadian political scene is that of a communications war. Marland argues that while rhetoric and image manipulation are as old as politics itself, there is something new under the political sun-branding. Brand Command's thesis is that centralization of power in the hands of the political elites has to be understood in the context of communication practices and technologies. With what is called the "permanent campaign", governing parties integrate governing with promotion of the image (brand) of the party leader and the larger party. The autonomy of parliamentarians, the media, and civil servants (who serve the people) is compromised as branding erodes essential barriers between partisanship and governance. Moreover, Marland argues that Westminster systems like Canada's-with their tendency toward party unity and centralization of power-are more prone to political branding than presidential systems. The branding of commodities begins in the mid-eighteenth century when consumer goods with little discernible difference (coffee, tea, cocoa, soup) were packaged and marketed around a brand name. Later, advances in consumer research allowed consumer desires and longings to be fed back into and stimulate the overdetermined brand. Marland does not suggest that Harper's Conservatives invented political marketing and branding, but they developed it to an extreme.

Promiscuously partisan public servants? Publicly defending and promoting the government’s reputation to the detriment of bureaucratic impartiality and truthfulness

“…Parliamentary committees thus provide an environment that should induce distinct types of testimony from senior public servants, depending on whether they are prioritizing impartial loyalty or promiscuous partisanship. Bourgault (2021) observes the reverence and preparation senior public servants give to committee appearances, not only because their audience includes members of parliament and the public, but because they offer a unique opportunity to escape the high degree of official message control common within the present era of governance (Marland, 2016) and show their true professional selves. As one senior public servant stated, "an important aspect of our communications [before parliamentary committees] is to foster trust among members of parliament .…”

Retourner sa veste au Québec : une étude des défections transpartisanes politiques de 1980 à 2018

“…À cet égard, il importe sans doute de tenir compte que les étiquettes de partis canadiens sont moins rigides que dans d'autres pays (Merolla et al, 2008). En même temps, le Canada se caractérise par une forte discipline de parti et des chefs de parti dominants (Carty, 2006) qui s'attendent à une cohésion des messages (Marland 2016a(Marland , 2016b(Marland , 2020, bien que la cohésion idéologique entre les membres demeure faible dans certains partis (Kam, 2009;Malloy, 2006). Cela fait du Canada un terrain fertile pour le changement de parti, dans la mesure où les chef⋅fe⋅s de parti exercent une autorité considérable sur leurs caucus, dont les membres peuvent choisir de quitter pour des questions de promotion, de politique ou de popularité.…”

“…Marc Picard a qualifié le style de Gilles Taillon, alors chef de l'ADQ, d'« autoritaire » (Robitaille, 2009). La question de la discipline de parti (Marland, 2016a(Marland, , 2016b(Marland, , 2020Godbout, 2020) ressort ici des propos des député⋅e⋅s dissident⋅e⋅s et vient affecter la loyauté envers leur parti d'origine. Si les élu⋅e⋅s demandent plus de liberté, les chef⋅fe⋅s estiment, quant à eux⋅elles, que le départ de certain•e•s député⋅e⋅s est un signe qu'il faut retravailler le rapport à la discipline dans le parti politique.…”

Memes, scenes and #ELXN2019s: How partisans make memes during elections

“…Canada has weaker levels of partisanship than the United States (Bélanger and Stephenson, 2010). Parties cautiously interact online, wary of risks and careful to set strict message discipline for candidates (Marland, 2016;Small et al, 2014). Canadian parties, like parties in the United Kingdom and the United States, have adopted citizeninitiated campaigning by encouraging members to act as personalized messengers, and have cautiously approached enlisting online partisans in the campaign (Gibson, 2015).…”

“…As seen in Appendix 2, most groups shared a lot of memes discussing other party leaders. Although groups differed in their treatment of other leaders (as we discuss next), memes often attempted to de-brand or deconstruct their opponents (Marland, 2016). In mocking party leaders and their respective supporters, memes cultivate an antagonism of us/them between partisans and their opponents while also shaping party identification.…”