Masked Abilities and Compatibilism

Fára, M

doi:10.1093/mind/fzn078

Cited by 188 publications

(104 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Campbell (2005); Perry (2004); Vihvelin (2004); Smith (2004); Fara (2008); John M. Fischer (2008); Randolph Clarke (2009). The claim that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities has been disputed since Frankfurt (1969).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency*

Deery

Bedke

Nichols

2013

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 1

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency*

Deery

Bedke

Nichols

2013

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 1

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“…And as we will see, even if there are sound arguments 11 See Newlands 2013. 12 See, e.g., Vihvelin 2004and Fara 2008and, most ambitiously and, most recently, Vihvelin 2013 See Clarke 2009 about the problems.…”

Section: The Conditional Analysis Vs a Dispositional Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Consequentialism and Free Will

Svedberg¹,

Tännsjö²

2017

The Harvard Review of Philosophy

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Many moral theories incorporate the idea that when an action is wrong, it is wrong because there was something else that the agent could and should have done instead. Most notable among these are consequentialist theories. Relatively little attention has been given to the question of how to understand the meaning of 'could have' in this specific context. However, without an answer to this question, consequentialist theories fail to yield determinate verdicts about the deontic status of actions in real scenarios. It is here argued that a conditional analysis provides the required answer and gives us the most plausible version of consequentialism. Such a conditional analysis has been universally rejected as an analysis of the general meaning of 'could have,' but we show that in the specific context of specifying the meaning of 'could have' in a criterion of right and wrong action, all the standard objections to it fail.

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“…The prosecution may fail to prove some element of actus reus or mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, or the defense 28 For example, there have been several attempts to reconcile PAP with determinism by understanding the ability to do otherwise in terms of the having of a disposition. See, for example, Smith 2003, Vihvelin 2004, Fara 2008. For criticism, see Clarke 2009 The skeptic might reply that a determined past prevents one from exercising one's capacities.…”

Section: Partial Responsibility and Excusementioning

confidence: 99%

Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility1

Brink¹,

Nelkin²

2013

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 1

121

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In this essay, we explore a conception of the nature and structure of responsibility that draws on ideas about moral and criminal responsibility. Though the two sorts of responsibility are not the same, the criminal law reflects central assumptions about moral responsibility, and the two concepts of responsibility have very similar structure. Our conception of responsibility draws on work of philosophers in the compatibilist tradition who focus on the choices of agents who are reasons--responsive and work in criminal jurisprudence that understands responsibility in terms of the choices of agents who have capacities for practical reason and whose situation affords them the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. 2 We treat these two perspectives as potentially complementary and argue that each can learn things from the other. Specifically, we think that criminal jurisprudence needs a more systematic conception of the capacities for normative competence and that ideas from the reasons--responsive literature on moral responsibility, some familiar and some novel, can fill this need. However, we think that moral philosophers tend to focus on the capacities involved in responsibility and so tend to ignore the situational element in responsibility recognized in the criminal law literature. Our conception of responsibility brings together the dimensions of normative competence and situational control, and we factor normative competence into cognitive and volitional capacities, which we treat as equally important to normative competence and, ultimately, responsibility. Moreover, we argue that normative competence and situational control can and should be understood as expressing a common concern that blame and punishment presuppose that the agent had a fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Thus, we treat the value that criminal law theorists associate with the situational element of responsibility as the umbrella concept for our conception of responsibility, one that explains the distinctive architecture of responsibility. 1 This essay is fully collaborative. The authors are listed in alphabetical order. The ideas for this essay grew out of a graduate seminar that we taught together on the topic of partial responsibility in 2008 and were refined in a seminar on responsibility that DB taught in 2011. Versions of this material were presented at

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Masked Abilities and Compatibilism

Cited by 188 publications

References 8 publications

Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency*

Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency*

Consequentialism and Free Will

Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility1

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