Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2019
DOI: 10.1145/3319535.3354200
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Cited by 73 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…Additionally, it would be interesting to study blockchain-based e-voting using postquantum algorithms that can resist quantum attacks [136,164]. According to Fernández-Caramés and Fraga-Lamas [165], the challenges of post-quantum blockchain include the key size required for post-quantum cryptosystems which is larger than that required for public-key cryptosystems, typically between 128 and 4096 bits.…”
Section: Potential Research Directionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Additionally, it would be interesting to study blockchain-based e-voting using postquantum algorithms that can resist quantum attacks [136,164]. According to Fernández-Caramés and Fraga-Lamas [165], the challenges of post-quantum blockchain include the key size required for post-quantum cryptosystems which is larger than that required for public-key cryptosystems, typically between 128 and 4096 bits.…”
Section: Potential Research Directionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consequently, continuous generation of new keys is required, which leads to high computational resource consumption and slacking of certain blockchain processes.Therefore, further research is required to balance the efficiency of blockchain and key generation and key size issues. Esgin et al [164] suggested that their proposed post-quantum blockchain scheme can be implemented in privacy preserving applications such as e-voting systems. Gao et al [136] constructed their scheme with code-based cryptography proposed by McEliece [166], which has not been broken so far, to be secure against quantum attacks.…”
Section: Potential Research Directionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We use a standard variant of M-LWE where both the error and secret coefficients are sampled uniformly from {−1, 0, 1}. This variant is commonly used in many recent proposals such as [12,13,14].…”
Section: Security Assumptions: Module-sis and Module-lwementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This parameter setting yields δ < 1.0045 for both M-SIS and M-LWE. δ ≈ 1.0045 has been used in recent works, e.g., [12,13,14] for targeting 128-bit post-quantum security. From here, we can compute the concrete signature length as…”
Section: Parameter Setting and Performance Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
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