2010
DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2010.522409
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Mechanistic Constitution in Neurobiological Explanations

Abstract: This paper discusses the constitution relation within the framework of the mechanistic approach to neurobiological explanation. It develops a regularity theory of constitution as an alternative to the manipulationist theory of constitution advocated by some of the proponents of the mechanistic approach. After the main problems of the manipulationist account of constitution have been reviewed, the regularity account is developed based on the notion of a minimal type relevance theory. A minimal type relevance th… Show more

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Cited by 43 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…Similar intuitions, but without a strong commitment to the problematic idea of spatial overlap, are expressed by philosophers of science who develop regularist notions of constitutive mechanistic explanation (see Couch, 2011;Harbecke, 2010). According to such positions, an activity A of a mechanism's part is constitutive for a phenomenon F if and only if the presence of A is an element of a minimal set of conditions whose joint satisfaction is sufficient for F's occurrence.…”
Section: Minimal Constitutivitymentioning
confidence: 91%
“…Similar intuitions, but without a strong commitment to the problematic idea of spatial overlap, are expressed by philosophers of science who develop regularist notions of constitutive mechanistic explanation (see Couch, 2011;Harbecke, 2010). According to such positions, an activity A of a mechanism's part is constitutive for a phenomenon F if and only if the presence of A is an element of a minimal set of conditions whose joint satisfaction is sufficient for F's occurrence.…”
Section: Minimal Constitutivitymentioning
confidence: 91%
“…That is, we may turn to the metaphysical question of what constitution actually is . Regularity‐based accounts (e.g., Couch, ; Harbecke, , ; Krickel, forthcoming) aim to illuminate the nature of this relation building on the idea that a mechanism's components are regularly involved in its exhibiting a certain phenomenon. Still, these accounts assume that constitutive relevance is some kind of non‐causal relation.…”
Section: Approaching Fat‐handedness and Underdeterminationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Craver 2001Craver , 2013I llari & Williamson 2010). Not incidentally, mechanistic accounts of constitutive relevance also fail to (explicitly) recognize the distinction between contrastive and common factors (e.g., Craver 2007;Harbecke 2010;Couch 2011;Baumgartner & Gebharter 2015).…”
Section: Making a Difference But To What?mentioning
confidence: 99%