Mexico: From Corporatism to Pluralism?

Grayson, George W.

doi:10.4324/9780429037177-18

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…The fact that business holds influence over economic policy is not new for Mexico, yet the ways in which the private sector exerts this influence have somehow changed. The lobbying industry is relatively nascent in Mexicohaving previously been submerged into hierarchical institutions of state corporatism (Luna and Tirado 1992;Grayson 1998;Schneider 2002). The present period displays a diverse set of tools for political influence deployed by business confederations.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Superfluous Congress

Gutiérrez

2021

Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

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This paper analyzes the roles played by the legislative, executive, and business sector in Mexico’s 2013 tax reform, drawing on original field-research findings. I examine each of these actors’ influence over the public period of congressional debate, as well as the typically invisible agenda-setting stage and the adoption of executive decrees following the legislative process. I find that Congress remains subordinated to the executive in budgetary matters and that business is more central in shaping the details of the tax bill. The tax reform achieved little, leaving the overall fiscal capacity of the Mexican State largely unchanged.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Superfluous Congress

Gutiérrez

2021

Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

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“…Under one-party dominance in 20th-century Mexico, sectoral organizations were embedded into the PRI through complex corporatist ties that offered organizations crucially important roles in markets, such as monopolies over public employment decisions or the distribution of crop inputs for farmers. In exchange, these organizations supported the PRI and mobilized their members and communities in elections (Collier & Collier, 1991; Grayson, 1998). While this politics was certainly riven with patronage, organization ties to party and roles in policy were stable, and organizations’ membership was guaranteed through mandatory membership laws.…”

Section: Interest Organizations In Mexicomentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentives for Organizational Participation: A Recruitment Experiment in Mexico

Palmer‐Rubin

Garay

Poertner

2020

Comparative Political Studies

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While the presence of a strong civil society is recognized as desirable for democracies, an important question is what motivates citizens to join organizations. This article presents novel experimental evidence on the conditions under which citizens join interest organizations. We presented 1,400 citizens in two Mexican states with fliers promoting a new local interest organization. These fliers contain one of four randomly selected recruitment appeals. We find evidence that both brokerage of state patronage and demand-making for local public goods are effective recruitment appeals. The effect for patronage brokerage is especially pronounced among respondents with prior organizational contact, supporting our hypothesis of a “particularistic socialization” effect wherein organizational experience is associated with greater response to selective material benefits. Our findings suggest that under some conditions, rather than generating norms of other-regarding, interest organizations can reinforce members’ individualistic tendencies.

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“…The Mexican context is informative because it presents conditions that are particularly threatening to interest organization autonomy. During the greater part of the 20th century, Mexican politics were dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which controlled organizational activity through top-down corporatist ties with labor, business, the peasantry, and other economic sectors (Collier, 1992; Grayson, 1998). The past three decades have witnessed a transition to multiparty competition between the PRI, the right-wing National Action Party (PAN) and the left-wing Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD).…”

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confidence: 99%

Evading the Patronage Trap: Organizational Capacity and Demand Making in Mexico

Palmer‐Rubin

2019

Comparative Political Studies

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When do organizations broadly represent the interests of their economic sectors and when do they narrowly represent the interests of members? This article investigates how agricultural and small-business organizations in Mexico make demands for programmatic policies or patronage benefits. Contrary to explanations based on the class of members, I show that the source of organizational capacity shapes demand-making strategies. Organizations that generate selective benefits internally are able to engage in programmatic policies that shape sectoral competitiveness, whereas organizations that fail to solve membership challenges internally are vulnerable to the patronage trap, a self-reproducing cycle wherein they become specialized in demand making for discretionary private goods. I generate this argument through process tracing of two agricultural organizations in Mexico. Analysis of an original survey of economic interest organizations provides broader evidence that organizational capacity is a better predictor of policy demands than social class.

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Mexico: From Corporatism to Pluralism?

Cited by 4 publications

References 1 publication

The Superfluous Congress

The Superfluous Congress

Incentives for Organizational Participation: A Recruitment Experiment in Mexico

Evading the Patronage Trap: Organizational Capacity and Demand Making in Mexico

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